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Representing Nazism: Advocacy and
Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie
Guyora Bindert
Among the ashes of the dead at Auschwitz, graverobbers found a jar. In
this jar was a diary, with directions for finding other diaries. The diaries
were written by the Sonderkommando, inmates charged with disposing of
the dead, which they did. But as they worked, they recorded their deeds,
so that the dead they incinerated would leave behind a residue of writing:
"At 10:00 in the morning, I have just burned my parents," reports one
diary.' At 10:10: "I have just burned my wife." And finally, at 10:20: "I
have just burned my children."'2 Perhaps some inmates accepted this grisly
assignment in hopes of saving themselves, but most must have known they
would last two months more at most, under conditions in which only
death offered mercy. We must assume that those who wrote to us thus
perpetuated their pain for one reason only-to communicate it to us. Ac-
cordingly we, the living, are derelict if we do not remember this pain.'
But should we also learn from it? Can we really hope to rectify it by
discovering its lessons? May we recover knowledge from the ashes of Au-
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schwitz, and walk away enriched? This Commentary on the trial of Klaus
Barbie argues that we must not allow ourselves to be edified by atrocity.
And yet this trial, "the most controversial in France since [that of]
Dreyfus,"4 and "one of the three great war crimes trials in the West,"5
was greeted as an occasion for self-improvement. The French government
promised "a pedagogic trial."' The Israeli government looked for "justice
that has educational significance."17 The New York Times hoped the trial
would "educate a new generation," while a representative of French Re-
sistance veterans hoped it would "deepen our understanding."9 Nazi
hunter Simon Wiesenthal felt that the trial would be "a proper history
lesson," and that its true significance was "symbolic." 1
Accordingly, the trial's chroniclers treated it as an object for interpreta-
tion: social historian Emmanuel Roy Ladurie predicted that it would be
"an enormous national psychodrama."" Few of the 800 journalists or
forty attorneys present at the trial failed to speculate on its "mean-
ing"-its meaning for France, its meaning for the West, even its meaning
for the "New Novel."1 2 The Los Angeles Times observed that the trial
sessions "seemed more like performances than presentation of informa-
tion," and that "newspaper accounts read like reviews of a play." 3
Some saw the trial as an even bigger show business phenomenon. The
Barbie trial promised to become a major motion picture, and a struggle
ensued for its direction. Defense attorney Jacques Verges, noting that
crime is the source of the greatest literature, announced that he was a film
director, shaping a story out of the rushes provided by the dossier and
testimony. 4 Marcel Ophuls, film chronicler of French collaboration and
Allied justice, impatiently awaited the trial so that it could provide the
conclusion of his film on the life of Klaus Barbie.15 While the entire trial
was being filmed by the government, 8 French TV viewers were shown
Claude Lanzmann's Shoah for the first time. The depressing documen-
4. Rosemberg, Barbie's Lawyer, From Guerilla Gun-Running to Nazi's Defence, Reuters, May
11, 1987 (NEXIS) (paraphrasing defense attorney Jacques Verge).
5. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, § 6, at 20, col. 1 (late city final ed.) (with the Nuremberg and
Eichmann trials).
6. French Hope Barbie Trial Will Not Become Trial of Their History, UPI, May 12, 1987
(NEXIS).
7. Immanuel, Israelis Offer to Help Prosecute Barbie, AP, Feb. 6, 1983 (NEXIS).
8. The Barbie Trial: Not Just Vengeance, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, § A, at 30, col. 1 (late city
final ed.).
9. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1987, § A, at 1, col. 1 (late city final ed.).
10. Barbie-Wiesenthal, Reuters, Feb. 7, 1983 (NEXIS).
11. The Trial of Vichy France, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1983, at 55.
12. Solomon, Klaus Barbie and The Conscience of the Literati, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, § 7, at
1, col. 1 (late city final ed.).
13. L.A. Times, July 5, 1987, § 5, at 2, col. 1 (home ed.).
14. Rosemberg, supra note 4.
15. Film: Marcel Ophuls on Barbie, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1988, § 2, at 21, col. 1 (late city final
ed.).
16. Film: Bearing Witness, N. Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1987, § 6, at 11-38, col. 1 (late city final ed.).
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tary's audience of 4 million, in the eyes of some observers, proved the
trial's success. 1
7
Why? Why was this trial, France's most important trial, ten-thousand
times a murder trial, important, above all, as culture?
In answering this question, Section I recapitulates the forty year evolu-
tion of Barbie's case to recall how he came to public notice first as the
slayer of a hero of the French left, then as the slaughterer of Jewish chil-
dren, and finally as the brutal henchman of a deposed Bolivian dictator.
Barbie, adept at making himself useful to governments, would never have
been captured had he not come to symbolize causes that transcended his
crimes. Captured and charged with "crimes against humanity," Barbie
served as an emblem of Nazism. Anxious to distinguish the atrocities suf-
fered by French partisans from those later suffered by Algerian rebels, the
French courts made Nazi ideology an element of "crimes against human-
ity." In sum, Section I explains how the Barbie trial's historical back-
ground and legal framework invited the prosecution and defense to con-
duct an edifying debate on the meaning of Nazi crimes.
Section II reveals that groups associated with the prosecution-the
French government, Resistance veterans, Jewish survivors, and the Israeli
government-greeted this invitation as an opportunity to define them-
selves by contrast to Nazism. Focusing on the influential efforts of prose-
cution witness Elie Wiesel to root Jewish identity in the memory of the
Holocaust, Section II argues that identities defined by reference to an en-
emy are inauthentic and ethically impoverished.
Section III applies this same criticism to the controversial defense of-
fered by Barbie's radical attorney Jacques Vergts. While the prosecution
case defined Judaism and French nationalism by contrast to Nazism, the
defense defined national liberation movements by contrast to Nazism.
Cynically assuming that society inevitably embodies deceit and contradic-
tion, Verges aspired to expose Western hypocrisy by conducting what he
called a "defense of rupture." He agreed to represent a Nazi in order to
unmask colonialism as the equivalent of Nazism. The difficulty is that
anticolonial movements traditionally aspire to embody not only the suffer-
ing, but also the authentic values of their peoples. Verges' cynical assump-
tion that society is inherently inauthentic prevents him from identifying
with the anticolonial causes he advocates.
The disabling assumption that authenticity is impossible prevails in-
creasingly within the French left as a result of the popularity of post-
structuralism. No one better illustrates the convergence of the postwar
identity crises of Judaism and French radicalism than post-structuralist
theorist Jacques Derrida. Section IV reads Derrida's "deconstruction" of
the concept of identity as a despairing response to the Jewish ordeal in the
17. L.A. Times, supra note 13.
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Holocaust. Rejecting the concept of identity as part of the "logic" of Na-
zism, Derrida is forced into exile from his own Jewish identity, driven to
the unacceptable conclusion that one cannot claim a Jewish identity as
authentically one's own without becoming a Nazi.
That we should not define ourselves by contrast to Nazism does not
mean that we cannot identify ourselves at all. The perspective taken in
this Commentary is that people must identify their value commitments in
order to act morally, and that self-definitions rooted in persecution enable
them to escape that obligation. Accordingly, those who define themselves
by condemning the oppression of others, benefit unjustly from the perse-
cution they so piously abhor. This Commentary's conclusion is that no
one can learn lessons from atrocity without also rationalizing it; no one
can rectify atrocity without also justifying it; and no one can be improved
by atrocity without being implicated in it. Self-definitions prove valueless
when they are accepted from killers in payment for the dead.
I. How NAZISM WAS BROUGHT TO TRIAL
The interpretation of Klaus Barbie began long before his trial; other-
wise he would never have come to trial at all. Barbie became a target for
French justice because he was successively associated with collaboration
and betrayal among the Resistance, with the murder of Jewish children;
with the martyrdom of the French Left, and with Latin American dicta-
torship. After Barbie's capture, French courts surmounted legal obstacles
to try him in hopes of contrasting French values with his Nazi ideology.
A. A Representative Nazi
The history of the past is never of the past only. It consists in small
part of the record of acts, in large part in the ever lengthening shadow of
their memory. Klaus Barbie's role in the enormous criminal activity of the
Nazi state-his crime-was that of a minor lieutenant. But the memory
of Klaus Barbie's crime-his case-grew in significance until, by the time
of his trial, it seemed to stand for the whole of Nazism, and for much
more besides.
1. The Case of Barbie
Born near Germany's French border, and of partly French extraction,
Barbie lost his father to the lingering effects of a World War I wound in
1933. The following year, Barbie graduated from high school. Finding
himself penniless and without prospect of employment, Barbie became in-
volved with the Nazi movement and in 1935, was accepted into the SS. 8
"Any idiot couldn't join the SS," Barbie has insisted. "I had to study law
18. T. BOWER, KLAUs BARBIE, THE BuTcHFR OF LYONS 20-21 (1984).
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and philosophy."19 Barbie became a lieutenant in the intelligence section
of the SD in 1940. He was posted to occupied Holland where he partici-
pated in roundups of Jews for deportation and execution. 0
Because of his fluency in French, Barbie was moved to occupied France
in 1942; towards the end of the year he became head of the Gestapo in
Lyons,21 the center of Resistance activity in the South.22 His chief respon-
sibilities were the suppression of the Resistance, communists and Jews.23
Historians estimate that more than 4,000 people were executed on his
orders during the last two years of the Occupation.2" In addition, the
records of a local magistrate indicate that the Gestapo deported 7,591 peo-
ple from Lyons to the death camps; but "shot or deported, there's no dif-
ference," Barbie reportedly philosophized. It is not known how many of
these approximately 12,000 victims were Jewish.2 5 Barbie's reputation as
the "Butcher of Lyons" rested also on his routine practice of torturing
suspected Resistance members and Jews in an effort to uncover other
members of both groups.2"
Immense as these crimes are, they constituted but a trickle amid the
Nazi torrent of death. In all, this minor lieutenant carried out or facili-
tated perhaps one tenth of one per cent of all the executions mandated by
his superiors. 7 What would eventually make his name a household word
in France, however, was the capture and death under torture of just one
victim-Jean Moulin, the leftist leader of the unified Resistance in
France.28 Handsome, charismatic and capable, Moulin was mourned by
the French left as a leader whose postwar popularity might have rivaled
De Gaulle's.
At war's end, the French government named Barbie as a wanted man,
but did not pursue him. From 1945 to 1947, Barbie lived a shadowy exis-
tence as a fugitive in occupied Germany; but by 1947, the United States
occupation force had lost interest in the punishment of war criminals. The
American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) hired Barbie to gather infor-
mation about communists in France, Germany and Eastern Europe. 9
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 26-27.
21. Section IV of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, an elite subdivision of the SS).
22. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 28.
23. Id. at 40.
24. Pre-trial probe of Nazi War Criminal Completed, U.P.I., July 20, 1985 (NEXIS). Bower
offers the very precise figure of 4,342 without explanation. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 16.
25. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 58-60.
26. Id. at 51-64.
27. It was not unusual to find minor officers exercising great power over life and death in the
Nazi regime. See Jackson, Report to President Truman on the Legal Basis for Trial of War
Criminals, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 144, 148, 149 (1946).
28. A. CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE 116 (1988) (Barbie's notoriety based
on Moulin's importance and popularity).
29. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 137-54.
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One of Barbie's American employers praised him as "strongly anticom-
munist and a Nazi idealist."30
In the postwar period France was more interested in the crimes of
French collaborators than those of German occupiers. Barbie first at-
tracted the attention of the French public in 1947, weeks after Resistance
leader Ren6 Hardy was acquitted of informing against Moulin. Hardy
was rearrested following the discovery that Barbie had interrogated him
shortly before capturing Moulin. Public pressure mounted to locate
Barbie as a prosecution witness.31
In 1948, the CIC permitted French officials to interrogate Barbie, who
did name Hardy as his informant. Nevertheless, the CIC would not turn
a valued agent over to the French, whom they considered communists. 2
For two years, unsuccessful attempts to summon Barbie brought his own
crimes under increasing scrutiny in France. At the end of this period, the
Americans offered Barbie's services as a witness against Hardy, on the
condition that he be returned. Now interested in trying Barbie as well, the
French government could no longer accept this condition. Lacking
Barbie's testimony, Hardy's prosecution failed again, this time provoking
a public furor in France against both the American government and
Barbie.3 In the face of increasing French pressure, the American govern-
ment in 1951 smuggled Barbie out of Germany to Bolivia, where he was
welcomed by a German emigre community which owned 60 percent of the
Bolivian economy.34
In 1952, a French military tribunal sentenced Barbie to death in absen-
tia for executions and deportations of suspected Resisters in the Jura re-
gion during April of 1944. In 1954, Barbie was again sentenced to death
for a number of executions committed in the Montluc prison."
Meanwhile, Barbie prospered in Bolivia. Entering the timber trade,
Barbie became a Bolivian citizen in 1957 under the name of Klaus Alt-
mann. In 1961 he was identified by German prosecutors, who informed
the French security services in 1963. However, neither country had an
extradition treaty with Bolivia. In 1966, the increasingly influential
30. Id. at 140.
31. Id. at 160.
32. Id. at 160-68; Hotel Terminus, The Life and Times of Klaus Barbie (S. Goldwyn 1988)
[hereinafter Hotel Terminus] (interview with Eugene Kolb).
33. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 160-68.
34. Id. at 173-81; R. WILSON, THE CONFESSIONS OF KI us BARBIE 92 (1984). For the official
United States government account of its relations with Barbie, read, with skepticism, A. RYAN,
KLAUs BARBIE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES (1983).
35. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 184. According to Bower's account, it does not appear that any
of Barbie's Jura region victims were killed because they were Jewish. Nevertheless, some of the
crimes charged at Barbie's early trials were committed against Jews. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985,
Cass. crim. Fr. (No. 859-5.166, LEXIS).
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Barbie organized a state-sponsored shipping business which enabled him
to become an arms merchant.36
The following year, Che Guevara and French writer R6gis Debray
were captured, waging a guerilla war in the Bolivian countryside. While
Guevara was shot, Debray was released in 1970, when a leftist regime
took power.37 For Debray, Barbie would become a symbol of Bolivian
injustice. In 1971, Nazi-hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfeld launched a
publicity campaign that focused on Barbie's deportation of one group of
Jewish children to the deathcamps. The publicity forced German prosecu-
tors to reopen Barbie's dormant file, and induced the French government
to request Barbie's extradition.38 But in the meantime, Colonel Hugo
Banzer, a member of Bolivia's powerful German community, had seized
the government with arms supplied by Barbie. 9 In 1973, the extradition
request was rejected,4" and the fall of the Allende regime foiled a plot by
the Klarsfelds and Debray to abduct Barbie to Europe via Chile.4'
Barbie remained influential in Bolivian politics throughout the seven-
ties, despite another change of regime. Finally, in 1980, he organized a
mercenary army of German and Italian neofascists that helped effect a
coup that brought Bolivia's leading cocaine barons to power.42
In 1982, however, the left-leaning President Siles-Zuazo was elected in
Bolivia, while a socialist government dominated by Resistance veterans
had come to power in France. Regis Debray was now President Francois
Mitterand's special assistant. At Debray's urging, the French government
apparently offered Bolivia an aid package in return for Barbie, whom the
Bolivians were now only too happy to deport.43 Germany also submitted
an extradition request.44 In February of 1983, Barbie was expelled to
France.45 After three years of investigation and litigation, Barbie was
charged with six "crimes against humanity" involving the deportation of
approximately 450 Jews and over 300 suspected Resisters to death camps,
as well as the murder by torture of one Jewish Resister.4 On May 11,
1987, Barbie's trial commenced. Forty civil prosecutors, representing
Barbie's victims and their relatives, joined the state prosecutor in summing
36. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 191.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 201-07.
39. Id. at 195, 210.
40. Id. at 209-10; Zeballos, Nazi Fugitive Klaus Altman, Reuters, Feb. 5, 1983 (NEXIS).
41. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 15-16.
42. Id. at 214-15; Bolivia's Labor Union Movement, Reuters, July 30, 1982 (NEXIS).
43. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 16-17, 219; Intense Diplomatic Activity, Reuters, Feb. 12, 1983
(NEXIS); Convicted Nazi War Criminal, Reuters, Feb. 24, 1983 (NEXIS); Diehl, For Struggling
Bolivia, Barbie Was a Convenient Gift to France, Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1983 (NEXIS).
44. T. BowER, supra note 18, at 219.
45. Id. at 224-25.
46. See infra notes 96, 97 and 102 and accompanying text.
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up the evidence against Barbie.4 7 On July 4, he was convicted on all
counts and sentenced to life imprisonment.48
2. Barbie's "Ideals"
From the time of his public exposure by Beate Klarsfeld in the early
1970s, Barbie has offered a hungry world press numerous interviews.
While admitting few specifics, he has supported those inclined to explain
atrocity in terms of ideology. "I am a convinced nazi,"49 he has said, and
"I stand to my opinion, right or wrong."5 "I would assess my life as
being absolutely positive," he said, shortly after his arrest.51 While he
doubts that six million Jews were killed, he praises Hitler for "doing
away with 6.5 million unemployed" and is "sorry about every Jew that I
did not kill."52 Despite his ideological commitments, however, Barbie con-
siders himself simply a professional soldier. His methods, he has said, are
no more brutal than those used by the French in Vietnam and Algeria.5"
Nevertheless, Barbie feels that the brutal methods of all nations are enno-
bled by their ideals: "Israel is in the same situation that we have been
during the war in the occupied countries. They have a resistance. And the
Israeli people must defend. And that's the same thing that made the SS.
Different people fight for country, for blood and to defend his ideals, his
serious ideals. The commander from Israel imitated the SS commander.
. . . He defends Zionist dignity. '54 Barbie's unabashed adherence to Na-
zism reassured his prosecutors that he would be an edifying villain, artic-
ulating the "ideals" they sought to condemn as inhuman.
B. "Crimes Against Humanity:" The Doctrinal Invitation to Represent
Nazism
In formulating the legal definition of Barbie's charges, the French judi-
ciary designed his trial as a demonstration of the meaning of Nazism. The
political and cultural importance of this lesson for France is revealed by
the legal obstacles the French judiciary surmounted in order to stage it.
47. "Any person who claims to be injured by a felony . . . may, in bringing a complaint before
the competent examining magistrate, constitute himself a civil party." C. PR. PEN. Fr. Art. 85 (1987).
See also Id. Arts. 86, 87 (further requirements for joining criminal prosecution as civil party).
48. Korolyov, Barbie Sentenced to Life Imprisonment, TASS, July 4, 1987 (NEXIS). Lewis,
Foreign Affairs; A Model of French Justice, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1987 (NEXIS).
49. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 208.
50. R. WILSON, supra note 34, at 126.
51. Nazi Gestapo Chief Unrepentant, UPI Feb. 13, 1983, (NEXIS).
52. Barbie-Interview, Reuters, Feb. 9, 1983 (NEXIS).
53. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 209; 'Butcher of Lyon' Plans Defense Strategy, AP, Feb. 20,
1983, (NEXIS).
54. R. WILSON, supra note 34, at 237.
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1. Obstacles to Prosecution in France
France's prosecution of Barbie was problematic for several reasons.
First, he could not be punished for those crimes of which he had previ-
ously been convicted. France's Code of Penal Procedure requires the exe-
cution of all criminal sentences within twenty years of conviction.55
Hence, France's highest court deemed Barbie's 1952 and 1954 sentences
for "murders, arsons, pillages and arbitrary sequestrations" void as of
1972 and 1974, respectively.5"
Having survived his death sentences, Barbie could not have been tried
for offenses based on the same acts without violating France's constitu-
tional prohibition on double jeopardy.57 Yet he could not be prosecuted for
other acts of murder, arson and wrongful imprisonment, because France's
general statute of limitations voids liability ten years after commission of
such felonies. 58
Hence Barbie remained liable only for imprescriptible crimes59 for
which he had never been prosecuted previously. The only crimes deemed
imprescriptible by French law are "crimes against humanity;" yet no such
crime was defined by French law during the Occupation. In 1945, how-
ever, France joined the London Agreement conferring apparently retroac-
tive jurisdiction upon the Nuremberg Tribunal to prosecute "crimes
against humanity" committed by agents of the Axis powers.60 This treaty
defined crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popu-
lation, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domes-
tic law of the country where perpetrated.""1 The other crimes "within the
55. C. PR. PEN. Fr. Art. 763 (1987).
56. "Crimes against humanity," recognized as a source of imprescriptible liability in 1964 , see
infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text, constitute the only exception to this statute of limitations.
While France's highest court later concluded that some of the acts for which Barbie was previously
convicted met the definition of crimes against humanity, he was not so charged at the time. Judgment
of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. crim. Fr. (No. 85-95.166, LEXIS). According to a court of appeals order,
quoted by this opinion, these crimes were characterized "'by tortures and summary executions of
members of the Resistance, of hostages and of Jews.'" Id. (D. Bacardi trans.) (on file with author).
57. See Judgment of June 3, 1988, Cass. crim. Fr. (No. 87-84.240 LEXIS) (denying motion to
quash conviction on grounds that it was based on acts for which Barbie was previously convicted).
58. This ten year period is tolled from the last official act of investigation or lprosecution if such
official action commences within ten years of the commission of the crime. C. PR. PEN. Fr. Art. 7
(1987).
59. That is, crimes, the liability for which could not be extinguished by the passage of time.
60. London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, United Kingdom-U.S.A.-France-U.S.S.R., 59 Stat. 1544, EAS No.
472, 83 U.N.T.S. 279 (1951). "Crimes Against Humanity," "War Crimes" and "Crimes Against
Peace" are defined in the Constitution of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6, id. at 288.
61. Id. The original english text placed a semicolon after the word "war." This was later changed
to a comma by agreement of all the parties to the treaty. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 61 (1947); J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 784 (1988).
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jurisdiction of the Tribunal" were "war crimes" and "crimes against
peace" committed by agents of the Axis. 2 All of the crimes against hu-
manity charged to Barbie were probably also war crimes.63
In 1964, fearful that the punishability of ordinary felonies committed
during the Occupation was expiring, the French legislature hurriedly
passed a statute declaring that "crimes against humanity as defined in the
United Nations Resolution of February 13, 1946, recognizing the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity in the August 8, 1945 Charter of the
International Tribunal, are, by their nature, imprescriptible."'6 As
Barbie's attorney, Jacques Verges, pointed out, this statute fails to specify
that either liability for crimes against humanity, or its imprescriptability,
shall be retroactive.6 Despite France's constitutional prohibition on retro-
active punishment,6 however, France's highest court ruled that the 1964
statute validly acknowledged France's seemingly retroactive establishment
by treaty of imprescriptible liability for "crimes against humanity." 6
Yet the London Agreement itself appeared retroactive in giving defini-
tion to crimes that took place before its ratification. 68 It is therefore fair to
ask how invocation of the London Agreement defeats the claim that
Barbie's imprescriptible liability was created retroactively. The answer of-
fered by the Office of Public Prosecutions and affirmed by France's high-
62. London Agreement, supra note 60, at 288. "Crimes against Peace" consist of planning or
conducting agression. Id.
63. War crimes were defined as "violations of the laws or customs of war, including murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occu-
pied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity." Id. Barbie's actions might not have been considered war crimes on
the assumption that Vichy France was not occupied territory, but an autonomous state no longer at
war with Germany. On this view, captured Resisters might be considered criminals rather than pris-
oners of war. But see infra text accompanying notes 87-93, for discussion of civil war.
64. 1964 J.O. (Fr.) 11788, Law No. 64-1326 (26 Dec. 1964). See T. BOWER, supra note 18, at
227-28 (describing circumstances of act's passage). The "U.N. Resolution" referred to "takles] note of
the laws and usages of warfare established by the fourth Hague Convention of 1907" and "the defini-
tion of . . . crimes ... against humanity contained in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal dated 6 August 1945." G.A. Res. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A164 at 10. After establishing the impre-
scriptibility of crimes against humanity in its own law, France was instrumental in the drafting of the
Convention on Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Hu-
manity, U.N. G.A. Res. 2391/XXIII (Dec. 9, 1968). See Levasseur, Les Crimes Contre L'humaniti
at le Probleme Leur Presciption 93 J. Du DROIT INT'L 259, 266 (1966).
65. See Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Cass. crim., Fr. (No. 83-94.425, LEXIS) (quoting appellant's
brief).
66. Id.; This prohibition may be found in CONST., Preamble (Fr.) (incorporating by reference
The Declaration of the Rights of Man, art. 8).
67. The court approved the position of the Office of Public Prosecution that: "the law of Decem-
ber 26, 1964. . . 'contains a precise reference to the Charter of the International Tribunal, appended
to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945,' the latter being integrated into the internal juridical
order, and that the scope of this law 'necessarily proceeds from the international text with which it
expressly forms a whole.' "See Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, supra note 65 (D. Bacardi trans.) (on file
with author).
68. This objection was offered by Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler as an American
proposal for a war crimes trial was being developed. Wechsler would later serve as legal adviser to the
Tribunal. B. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977).
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est court, was that "the incrimination of crimes against humanity is in
accordance with the general principles of law recognized by the civilized
nations . . . as such these crimes escape the principle of retroactivity." 9
This is the same response offered by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and by
leading scholarly interpreters of the London Agreement, to the charge that
the Nuremberg prosecutions were retroactive. Their argument was that
the London Agreement did not create liability for crimes against human-
ity, but merely recognized that such liability was already a part of cus-
tomary international law.7 0 Accordingly, United Nations Resolution 95(I)
affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of
the Niirnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal. 17 1 In acceding
to the London agreement, therefore, France affirmed the preexisting and
universal authority of these principles of international law.72
What are the "principles of international law" that establish the crimi-
nality of crimes against humanity? This question has generated two re-
sponses. The view adopted by the Nuremberg Tribunal sees crimes
against humanity as prohibited by the customary law of war7 3 Adhering
to this view, the International Law Commission redefined crimes against
humanity as "inhuman acts committed against civilians or persecutions
. . . when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in exe-
69. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, supra note 56.
70. "The Charter. . . is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation."
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG 433-44,
(1950) quoted in Tornaritis, Individual and Collective Responsibility in International Criminal
Law, I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 103, 113 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds.
1973); 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 744 (1970) (Nuremberg Tribunal's judgment re-
flects scholarly tradition and progressive acceptance by states that "activities mala in se are juridically
condemnable and that international law comprehends such activities."); Bierzanek, The Prosecution of
War Crimes, 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559, 576 (M. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda eds. 1973) (London Agreement "founded on the premise that violation of the principles of
international law entails, even when there are no specific provisions defining the implications of such
a breach, liability in international law.").
71. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946). For a discussion of the
legislative history of this resolution, see The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal:
History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/5, at 11-33. United Nations Resolution 3(I), referred to in
the French statute of 1964, refers more specifically to "the fourth Hague Convention of 1907." See
supra note 64. This Convention has been consulted in interpreting "the principles of international
law" referred to in Resolution 95(I). See infra note 78.
72. For the argument that the conception of crimes against humanity established in customary
international law involved no notion of prescription, see Levasseur, supra note 64, at 275-76, 283.
73. 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 613-14 (quoting
From Judgment of The Nuremberg Tribunal, Sept. 30, 1946) (war crimes were recognized in the
Hague Convention of 1907, codifying preexisting custom. Crimes against humanity, as a form of war
crimes, must take place during war, or in furtherance of other war crimes). The Tribunal's legal
adviser, Herbert Wechsler, had always been uncomfortable about the international punishment of
internal atrocities implicit in the concept of crimes against humanity. See supra note 68. This may
have caused the Tribunal to work at cross-purposes to its own charter. See Finch, The Nuremberg
Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 23 (1947) (Tribunal "disregards the express
terms of the Charter on this particular definition."). The Tribunal's limitation of crimes against hu-
manity to traditional war crimes was followed by some lower Allied tribunals as well. See Cowles
Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 299, 309-13 (1948) (reporting U.S.
military trial of sanatorium administrators for killing Polish and Russian citizens; murders of German
citizens excluded from charges).
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cution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war
crime. '
The difficulty with this effort to absorb crimes against humanity into
the uncontroversial category of war crimes is that it fails to explain why
the allies found it necessary to invent a new category of international
crime. By all accounts they did so in the belief that inhumane acts com-
mitted by the Nazi regime against its own citizens and those of its allies
would not be punished under the customary laws of war.7 5 This belief is
reflected in the London Agreement's specifications that inhumane acts
could be punished as crimes against humanity if committed against "any"
civilian population, even "before" the war."8 Supporting this interpreta-
tion, the original English text separated the clause on "inhumane acts"
from the clause on "persecutions . . . in execution of . . . any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," with a semicolon."
The notion that a government's inhumane acts against its own popula-
tion may be punished even outside the context of a war relies on custom-
ary humanitarian law, rather than the law of war."8 The view that liabil-
ity for crimes against humanity has an independent basis in humanitarian
law is reflected in the practice of the Allied occupation authorities, and
confirmed in United Nations resolutions." At least one commentator in-
74. Report of the International Law Commission to The General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No.12) at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
75. Roeling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra note 70, at 590, 591-92; Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of War,
in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1974) 104, 115 n.; B.
SMrrIH, supra note 68, at 27, 33; cf. Id. at 60 (arguing that concept of conspiracy brought atrocities
committed against German subjects within ambit of war and, therefore, of war crimes).
76. London Agreement, supra note 60, at 288.
77. See Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 22 (1947).
By agreement of all the signatories, this decisive semicolon was later replaced with an ambiguous
comma. See J. OLIVER, N. LEECH & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (1988)
794; Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 61 (1947) (asserting that the
substitution of comma clearly excluded possibility that inhumane acts unconnected with war could be
punishable).
78. International acceptance of the authority of a humanitarian law transcending the customs of
war is evidenced by the oft-cited Preamble to the 4th Hague Convention, reading: "in cases not cov-
ered by the rules adopted by then, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and governance of the principles of the law of nations, derived from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience." See
Bierzanek, The Prosecution of War Crimes, I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
supra note 70, at 559, 574 (noting influence of this text on Allies' conception of crimes against hu-
manity); Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need
for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 589 (1983) (Hague Preamble evidence of human rights
foundation to the customary law of war); The Law of Land Warfare, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field
Manual (FM 27-10) (1956) (As amended by change no. 1, 1976) (quoted in N. LEECH, J. SWEENEY
& C. OLIVER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 761 (1988) (Hague Preamble evidence of bind-
ing authority of customary humanitarian law); Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 22-23 (1947) (crimes against humanity distinguishable from war crimes, on
the basis of Hague Preamble and tradition of humanitarian intervention against government extermi-
nations of their own subjects); and Levasseur, supra note 64, at 270-71 (1966) (increasing distinction
between crimes against humanity and war crimes, growing out of tradition of humanitarian
intervention).
79. Id. at 261-64, citing Allied Control Council Law no. 10, various judgments reported in The
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sists that it "undoubtedly" informed the French legislature's intentions in
1964.80 Such efforts to detach crimes against humanity from the law of
war have been criticized as entailing international interference in the in-
ternal affairs of sovereign states.81 But whether grounded in the law of
war or humanitarian law, the French judiciary's claim that crimes against
humanity are recognized by customary international law was aimed at
denying their retroactivity.
Basing liability for crimes against humanity on customary international
law also enabled France's highest court to wink at the irregularity of
Barbie's arrest. Conforming neither to French nor Bolivian extradition
procedures, Barbie's deportation from Bolivia to France was justified on
the grounds that "because of their nature, crimes against humanity...
do not come under French internal law only, but also under an interna-
tional penal order to which the notion of boundaries and the extradition
rules which ensue are fundamentally unknown.""2 Hence, Barbie's irreg-
ular arrest was "in accordance with the general principles of law recog-
nized by all nations.""3 France justified this arrest on the same grounds on
which Israel justified its abduction of Eichmann: the increasingly accepted
claim that international law creates universal jurisdiction to pursue and
prosecute criminals against humanity."M
By stressing the customary international law basis of Barbie's liability,
the French judiciary was able to deny the retroactivity of his prosecution
and the illegality of his arrest; but it was also forced to admit the univer-
sal applicability of imprescriptible criminal liability for crimes against hu-
manity. The Treaty of London gave the Nuremberg Tribunal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by agents of the Axis powers only. Because the
London Agreement defined at least some crimes against humanity by ref-
erence to other crimes "within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," one
might argue that, by definition, crimes against humanity could be commit-
War Crimes Trial Law Reports, and General Assembly Resolution 95 of Dec. 11, 1946, supra note
71.
80. Id. at 280.
81. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
770, 785-86 (1947). At least two responses have been advanced: (1) "since the destruction of...
groups challenges civilization itself, it engages international interest." D. O'CONNELL, II INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 744 (1970). (2) crimes against humanity are creatures of international law because they
concern the policies of states rather than individuals. Levasseur, supra note 64. This latter argument
for international supervision of municipal affairs finds expression in the French judiciary's concep-
tions of crimes against humanity as the product of a state policy or ideology. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 96-108.
82. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983 Cass. crim. Fr. (No. 83-93.194 LEXIS) (quoting opinion of Office
of Public Prosecutions with approval) (D. Bacardi, trans.) (on file with author).
83. Id.
84. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 859 (1987) (Eichmann's charges included crimes against humanity); RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES, § 404 (recognizing "universal
jurisdiction" to "punish certain offenses recognized by the community of the nations as of universal
concern such as. . . genocide [and] war crimes.");Judgment of Adolf Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 5
(1968) (universal jurisdiction justifies abduction).
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ted only by agents of the Axis powers. But because of the customary ori-
gins of crimes against humanity, the London Agreement has not been read
this way.85
Accordingly, the invocation of the customary origins of the concept of
crimes against humanity meant that such crimes could be committed by
anyone, including French officials. This enabled Barbie's defense attor-
ney, Jacques Vergts, to claim plausibly that French soldiers had commit-
ted crimes against humanity by killing and torturing Algerians, both com-
batants and noncombatants, during the Algerian Revolution." If French
soldiers killed and tortured noncombatants during the Algerian Revolu-
tion, did they commit crimes against humanity as defined in customary
international law? If liability for crimes against humanity is grounded in
humanitarian law, then inhumane treatment of any civilian population is
a crime against humanity. But if liability for crimes against humanity is
grounded in the law of war, mistreatment of civilians only qualifies as a
crime against humanity if it occurs in conjunction with a war.
Can a civil war like the Algerian Revolution be considered subject to
"the laws and customs of war?"8 It can. The Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War does not define
"cwar crimes" as such, substituting the concept of "grave breaches,'' 88
which each signatory is obliged to prosecute.89 These "grave breaches"
include the killing, torture, inhumane treatment, and unlawful deporta-
tion or confinement of "persons protected by this convention."90 Article 3
of the convention defines noncombatants and prisoners taken in internal
85. Instead, "crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" is generally understood to refer to
war crimes and crimes against peace. This reading is reflected in the International Law Commission's
later formulation of "The Principles of Nuremberg," which defines crimes against humanity without
reference to the Axis powers. Report of the International Law Commission U.N. GAOR V. Supp. 12,
U.N. Doc. A/1316/14 14 (1950). Any reading of the Treaty of London's definition of crimes against
humanity that separates the "inhumane acts" clause from the clause prohibiting "persecution . . .[in
the course of] crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," is inconsistent with the claim that
crimes against humanity can be committed only by agents of the Axis. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 239-48 and accompanying text. During much of the revolt, argued Verges, the
French government denied that the participants were belligerents, and failed to accord those arrested
the protections accorded prisoners of war. Hence, even the combatants could be considered victims of
crimes against humanity. See A. BENABDALLAH, M. COURRgGk, M. OUSSEDIK, J. VERGgs & M.
ZAVRIAN, D:FENSE POLITIQUE 51-52 (1961) (all quotes, unless otherwise specified, translated by C.
Bell & G. Binder) [hereinafter DFENSE POLITIQUE]; cf. J. BOND, RuLSs OF RIOT: INTERNAL CON-
FLICT AND ThE LAW OF WAR 114 (1974) (Red Cross construed French practice of interning sus-
pected rebels in special camps rather than prisons as treatment "closely related" to that governing
prisoners of war). As is typically the case during counterinsurgency, the lines between civilian and
combatant victims is sometimes blurred. See, e.g., F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH
254-64 (1968) (descriptions of contexts of some atrocities committed in Algeria).
87. London Agreement, supra note 60, at 288.
88. J. PiCTFr, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS:
COMMENTARY 597 (1958) ("grave breaches" chosen in preference to "war crimes" during drafting of
Articles 146 and 147).
89. Id. (Art. 147).
90. Id. (Art. 146).
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conflicts as "protected persons" and specifically prohibits each of these
forms of abuse, extending the customary law of war crimes to internal
conflicts." Eventually, both sides in the Algerian dispute publicly ac-
cepted the applicability of Article 3 to the conflict.92 Even if the prohibi-
tion of crimes against humanity is a creature of the law of war only, that
law applied to the Algerian dispute. Any inhumane treatment of civilians
during the Algerian civil war would have constituted crimes against hu-
manity. 93 Any inhumane treatment of prisoners motivated by their race,
religion, or political beliefs would also have constituted crimes against
humanity.
This makes it especially embarrassing that France shirked the obliga-
tion imposed by the law of war to prosecute all "grave breaches" of it. In
1962 the French legislature granted French soliders amnesty for all "in-
fractions" committed in combating the Algerian revolt. In 1964, days
before declaring crimes against humanity imprescriptible, mutinous of-
ficers were excluded from this amnesty, but it was in other respects con-
firmed. In 1968, the amnesty was extended to the mutinous officers
again."" Each of these amnesty laws prescribed possible crimes against
humanity, in seeming violation of the 1964 imprescriptibility statute, the
London Agreement, and the principles of international law on which both
were purportedly based. Because French law views treaties as superior to
statutes, these amnesties appear illegal.9
This apparent prescription of crimes against humanity by the same leg-
islature that declared crimes against humanity imprescriptible set a legal
lacuna directly in the path of the Barbie prosecution. Thus, if they hoped
to punish Barbie, French courts faced a painful choice. They could nar-
row the definition of "crimes against humanity," so as to distinguish some
of Barbie's crimes from those commonly attributed to the French Army in
Algeria. Alternatively, they could retain the London Agreement's broad
91. The fact that Art. 3 is the only conduct rule in the Convention governing treatment of prison-
ers and civilians in internal conflicts (see J. PcrET, supra note 88, at 34) does not remove it from the
ambit of the enforcement rules in Articles 146 and 147. According to Pictet, Article 3 had roots in
customary international law antedating World War II. Id. at 29-33. See also Meron, The Geneva
Convention as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. IN''L LAW 348 (1987) (argument that the Geneva Con-
vention should be viewed as declaratory of customary law of nations); Veuthey, Some Problems of
Humanitarian Law in Noninternational Conflicts and Guerilla Warfare, in I A TREATISE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 422-24; Tabenfeld, The Applicability of the
Laws of War in Civil War, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 499 (J. Moore ed.
1974) (long scholarly tradition of support for application of laws of war to civil wars).
92. J. BOND, supra note 86, at 60.
93. Note that if the Algerian Revolution is not considered a war then even rebels must be consid-
ered civilians, protected by a humanitarian law conception of crimes against humanity.
94. 1962 J.O. (Fr.) 3144, Decree No. 62-328 (March 22, 1968) ("the infractions"); 1964 J.O.
(Fr.) 11499, Law No. 64-1269 (Dec. 23, 1964) ("all infractions committed before March 20"); 1968
J.O. (Fr.) 7521, Law No. 68-697 (July 31, 1968) ("all infractions"). See Chronique, D.S. Jur. 21
(1968 LEXIS) (la notion de 'manquement a l'honneur, a la probitE et aux bonnes moeurs) (discussion
of periodic political amnesties in French law).
95. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983, supra note 82 (superiority of conventional to statutory law).
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definition of imprescriptible "crimes against humanity" and lay the basis
for an attack on the validity of the amnesty laws. Their choice of the first
alternative would make the meaning of Nazism the central issue at
Barbie's trial.
2. "A Deliberate State-Controlled Policy"
Shortly after his return to France, Barbie was charged with participa-
tion in eight "crimes against humanity," involving the deportation, shoot-
ing and torture of Jews and suspected Resisters.96 On July 20, 1985,
however, Investigating Magistrate Christian Riss dropped all charges for
crimes against suspected Resisters, retaining only the charges for deport-
ing three groups of Jews: some ninety seized at a Jewish community
center, about fifty discovered at a secret children's camp in Izieu, and over
300 sent from Lyons as the Germans withdrew.97
In upholding this decision, a Paris Court of Appeals defined crimes
against humanity as "the persecution extending to the extermination, in
peacetime as well as in wartime, . . . of any noncombatant because of
their race or their religious or political beliefs in application of a deliber-
ate state controlled policy, useless to the operations of war."9" In so doing,
the Court of Appeals narrowed the definition of crimes against humanity
in three ways: 1) by conjoining the London Agreement's two disjunctive
criteria, so that a crime was against humanity only if directed against a
noncombatant and motivated by animus against the victim's origins or
beliefs; 2) by requiring that this animus be expressed in a state policy,
whereas the London agreement had recognized crimes against humanity
committed against the perpetrator's own compatriots and contrary to the
laws of the perpetrator's government;99 and 3) by requiring that the crime
have no military utility.
For the Court of Appeals, the brutal suppression of a revolt merely
involved illegal means to a legitimate end; by contrast, crimes against hu-
manity required the illegal objective of gratifying hatred. Hence, the
Court of Appeals characterized Barbie's suppression of the Resistance as
96. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 94, 226 (detailing charges and their bases).
97. Riss also dropped several other charges for lack of evidence. Pretrial Probe of Nazi War-
Criminal Completed, UPI, July 20, 1985 (LEXIS). The investigating Magistrate is distinct from the
prosecuting attorney in France. C. PR. PEN. Fr. Art. 49 (1987). If the investigating magistrate deter-
mines that a charge is not supported by the facts, she must issue an order discontinuing the charges.
Id. Art. 177.
98. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, supra note 56. Appeals from an order of the Investigating Magis-
trate discontinuing charges may be brought be the Prosecuting Attorney, the Office of Public Prosecu-
tions, and civil parties. C. PR. PEN. Fr. Art. 183, 186. The defendant may appeal orders requiring her
pretrial detention or supervision and hence may challenge the legality of the charges continued by the
Investigating Magistrate. Id., Art. 186.
99. German killings of German citizens on German soil would still be crimes against humanity
even if "contrary to the laws of the country where committed." But c.f., Levasseur supra note 64, at
269-71 (arguing that only operation of state policy makes internal violence subject of international
criminal law).
1336 [Vol. 98: 1321
Klaus Barbie
one might easily characterize the French suppression of the Algerian re-
volt: as militarily useful mistreatment of combatants motivated by no offi-
cial policy of racial, religious or political animus."' The Court of Appeals
had succeeded in rationalizing the amnesty of the French Army's Algerian
indiscretions at the cost of extinguishing Barbie's liability for crimes
against the Resistance.
Had this decision stood, Barbie's trial would have afforded its audience
little opportunity for veneration of the French Resistance. Such a trial
might not have involved any attempts to define Nazi ideology, although it
would have included evidence of Germany's systematic policy of harming
Jews. Had the French courts left out this requirement that crimes against
humanity involve a state policy, the prosecution's case would have been
complete upon a showing that Barbie killed or deported people merely
because they were Jews. In short, had the French courts been willing to
forego Barbie's prosecution for crimes against the Resistance, Barbie's
trial might have occasioned no representations of Nazism.
3. Ideological Hegemony
But the Cour de Cassation refused this bargain: it insisted on distin-
guishing Barbie's repression of the Resistance from the French Army's
repression of the Algerian revolution. France's high court did so by rede-
fining crimes against humanity as "all inhuman acts and persecutions
which, in the name of a state practicing a policy of ideological hegemony,
have been committed systematically, not only against persons because of
their membership in a racial or religious group, but also against oppo-
nents of this policy, whatever the form of their opposition."' 1
Recall that the London Agreement deemed the execution of combatants
to be a crime against humanity only if motivated by animus toward the
victims' origins or beliefs, thereby involving "persecution." In the Barbie
case, however, France's highest court expanded the class of potential vic-
tims of crimes against humanity to include any combatant "opposing" the
persecution of others because of their origins or beliefs. This opposition,
moreover, can take military form and need not involve any expression of
opinion. By means of this decision, anyone killed for posing a military
obstacle to the Nazi state has been transformed into a political martyr, a
victim of persecution. Provided that a state "practices a policy of ideologi-
cal hegemony," any soldier that the state kills on or off the field of battle
becomes a victim of "crimes against humanity." On the basis of this defi-
nition, the Cour de Cassation quashed the Court of Appeals decision that
had upheld the Investigating Magistrate's decision to drop all charges for
100. Id. Cf. DIFFNSE POLITIQUE, supra note 86, at 59-64 (characterizing French repression in
Algeria as "genocide").
101. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, supra note 56.
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crimes against the Resistance. As a result Barbie was recharged for the
deportation of more than 300 gentile Resistance suspects during 1943 and
1944 and the murder by torture of Jewish Resister Marcel Gompel.0 2
At least one commentator has hailed the Cour de Cassation decision as
potentially covering atrocities against civilians "not because they are Jew-
ish, partisans or political opponents but only because they belong to the
enemy. '11 °3 Under this interpretation, at least some of the atrocities com-
mitted by the French in Algeria would be crimes against humanity. But
such an interpretation cannot be right. The opinion stresses that repres-
sive measures against the Resistance constituted crimes against humanity
because "they were presented, by those in whose name they were perpe-
trated, as politically justified by the national socialist ideology."' 01 In ap-
plying this decision to reinstate charges for atrocities against the Resis-
tance, a Paris Court of Appeals agreed that "the perpetrator of the crime
against humanity should have acted within the framework of his affilia-
tion with a policy of ideological hegemony such as the Third Reich's Na-
tional Socialist ideology."' 01 5 While this appellate court dismissed the tor-
ture of Resisters as militarily rather than ideologically motivated, it
viewed their deportation to death camps as an expression of "the Third
Reich's policy of ideological hegemony.""' In other words, Resisters were
"persecuted" for their beliefs, as part of a systematic policy of exterminat-
ing those politically opposed to Nazi ideology.
For the French courts, "crimes against humanity" came to mean all
and only crimes undertaken on behalf of a state committed to Nazi ideol-
ogy. Hence, Barbie's prosecutors were required to identify the Nazi ideol-
ogy his crimes enforced, and the ideals for which the Resistance was
martyred and France liberated.107 And every noble ideal attributed to
102. The deportation accounted for two additional charges. The murder was a third. Gompel was
skinned alive. See Id.; Miller, French Appeals Court Ruling Delays Barbie Trial, N.Y. Times, Dec.
21, 1985, § 1, at 4, col. 1; Theolleyre, Barbie to Face Three Charges of Crimes Against Humanity,
Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1986, at 11.
103. A. CASSESE, supra note 28, at 112.
104. Decision of Dec. 20, 1985, supra note 56. The opinion apparently refers to the Court of
Appeals' observation that Nazi propaganda characterized Resistance members as "judeo-Bolcheviks."
Id. In a gloss on this case Judge Fernand Chapar (who was not involved in the decision) ruefully
distinguishes Cassese's expansive conception of crimes against humanity from the court's. Chapar
regrets that the opinion does not simply follow the London Agreement's definition of "crimes against
humanity" and characterize the Resisters as victims because they were never recognized as belligerents
"by the Germans, who should have, if they had recognized them as such, granted them the status of
war prisoners." Annotation, D.S. Jur. 504 (Oct. 30, 1986). Of course this standard might also con-
demn the French of crimes against humanity for never granting arrested and tortured Algerians the
status of war prisoners. See supra notes 86, 92 and accompanying text. This sort of formal proof that
victims of atrocity are necessarily civilians founders on the fact that torture and murder are inappro-
priate treatment for civilians as well as prisoners of war under the court's opinion. One could just as
easily argue that Algerian and French Resisters must have been soldiers because their captors cer-
tainly didn't treat them like civilians.
105. Theolleyre, supra note 102.
106. Id. The basis for this distinction between torture and deportation is that the torture was
presumably motivated by the hope of eliciting information whereas the deportation appeared punitive.
107. Barbie's charges may be contrasted with the less ideologically focused charges he would have
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France in such a trial served to distinguish France's repression of Algeria
as a mere crime of war because, after all, the French were not Nazis.10 8
The French judiciary required representations of the ideas embodied by
Nazism and its victims as proof of Barbie's guilt. This Commentary's sec-
ond Part interprets and critiques the prosecution's enthusiastic response to
this doctrinal requirement.
II. PROSECUTING NAZISM
The French judiciary apparently hoped that the Barbie trial would il-
lustrate French humanity by contrast to Nazi inhumanity. Accordingly,
much of the prosecution's lengthy case consisted of testimony defining and
explaining Nazism. "Crimes against humanity are committed after a plot
and in this case stem from Nazi doctrine," explained Prosecutor Pierre
Truche10 9 "[These] witnesses will speak only of Nazi ideology."" 0 De-
fense attorney Verges protested to the court that "You are not here to
condemn an ideology. The place for that is a political meeting. You are
here to judge a man."'1 Yet French officials proclaimed that the condem-
nation of Nazism was the principal purpose of Barbie's trial." 2 The ensu-
ing analysis of the prosecution's condemnations of Nazism reveals the con-
flicting efforts of different groups to define themselves by contrast to
Nazism. A subsequent critique of the use of war crimes trials to gain
recognition for Judaism shows the futility of identifying oneself by one's
enemies rather than one's own beliefs.
faced upon extradition to Germany. Like France, West Germany retroactively eliminated the statute
of limitations for certain crimes in order to preserve liability for Nazi atrocities. STGB § 78 (1980).
See also Responses to World War II Criminals and Human Rights Violators: National and Com-
parative Perspectives, 8 BOSTON C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 3, 9 (1988) (remarks of G. Fletcher). Un-
like France, however, Germany eschewed the Nuremberg Tribunal's "Crimes against Humanity"
formula, instead preserving liability for ordinary murder, as well as genocide. The murder statute
punishes deliberate or reckless killings motivated by cruelty, greed, lust or "other base motives."
STGB § 211 (1980). The genocide statute, patterned on the International Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III)(A), U.N. Doe. A1810, at 174
(Dec. 9, 1948), 78 U.N.T.S., ratified by Federal Republic of Germany Nov. 24, 1954, 277, punishes
killing, torturing, starving, forcibly converting, or preventing the birth of members of a national, racial
or religious group with the intention of destroying that group. STGB § 220 (1980). Hence a German
trial of Barbie for complicity in the murder of suspected Resisters and Jews could have focused more
narrowly on Barbie's state of mind, rather than Nazi ideology generally.
108. See Rosemberg, Barbie's Lawyer Accused of Trying to Put France on Trial, Reuters, June
24, 1987 (NEXIS) (Private prosecutor Nogueres distinguishes between crimes committed during oc-
cupations of France and Algeria).




112. The Trial of Vichy France, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1983, at 55; Judge Refuses to Free
Nazi War Criminal, AP, June 10, 1983, (NEXIS).
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A. Conflicting Representations of Nazism
1. The Ambiguity of Uniqueness
The prosecution insisted that Nazi crimes were unique. For many
Frenchmen, the Nazis' uniquely systematic program of murder served to
absolve France by comparison. Henri Nogueres, an attorney for the
French Human Rights League, explained: "Crimes were perpetrated in
Algeria, but not in the name of a state doctrine or of a monstrous system.
They were war crimes, not crimes against humanity, and they took place
in spite of a democracy we are proud of and not in its name as was the
case in Nazi Germany." ' Veterans of the Resistance felt ennobled by the
uniqueness of their enemy. "No matter how many traitors . . . were in
the Resistance, it would still be a noble cause, because it was the resis-
tance to Nazism," commented the socialist weekly, La Nouvel Ob-
servateur."' For many French Jews, it was the Jewish identity of the
victims that rendered Nazi crimes unique. According to Simone Weil, the
trial's only important message could be that "millions . . . were extermi-
nated, not because of what they did, but because of who they were."115
Prosecution witness Elie Wiesel felt that the suffering of the victims bur-
dened their killers with unique guilt. No words could describe this "un-
paralleled tragedy," he said, and no punishment was adequate for these
"crimes . . . of an absolute nature."""
Thus the uniqueness of Nazi crimes could stand for either the compul-
sive efficiency of the Nazis or the concentrated agony of the Jews. As the
prosecution's historical testimony unfolded, these two perspectives fused in
an interpretation of Nazi crimes as the inevitable product of a racist ideol-
ogy. Historian Leon Poliakov testified that extermination of Jews and
Gypsies was essential to Nazism. "Only a pure race can master the
earth," he quoted Hitler.11 7 "At Auschwitz we witnessed the systematic
application of Hitler's racist doctrine, the doctrine according to which the
Germans were a superior people with a mission to exterminate the
others," added former Resistance leader Marie-Claude Vaillant Coutu-
rier. 1 Such testimony fulfilled the hope of Lyon's Rabbi that the trial
would "show where racism and intolerance can lead."'1 9
113. Rosemberg, supra note 109. This view was supported by the socialist weekly Le Nouvel
Observateur. See Rosemberg, Barbie's Trial Prompts French Soul-Searching, Reuters, May 17, 1987
(NEXIS).
114. Meisler, No 'Trial of Collaborators' Expected With Barbie Away from Court, L.A. Times,
May 16, 1987, at 113, col. 1.
115. Bernstein, Spirits Haunting a Belated Courtroom Reckoning, N.Y. Times, May, 18, 1987,
at A4, col.3.
116. Rosemberg, Wiesel Addresses Barbie Trial, Clashes Erupt, Reuters, June 2, 1987
(NEXIS); Campbell, Barbie Said to Find Conviction 'Incredible', AP, July 4, 1987 (NEXIS).
117. Rosemberg, Barbie Trial Enters New Stage of Historical Testimony, supra note 109.
118. Rosemberg, Auschwitz Was Laboratory for Racial Purity Doctrine, Reuters, June 10, 1987
(NEXIS).
119. Bortin, One Year After Return Gestapo Chief Is No Closer to Trial, Reuters, Feb. 3, 1984
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2. The Ambiguity of Racism
But beneath the surface of these pieties controversy lurked. Racism by
itself cannot explain Nazi crimes because, though always contemptible,
racism does not generally lead to extermination. Even the Nazis, who
viewed many races as inferior, targeted only the Jews and Gypsies for
extermination. For many Jewish commentators, racism is too universal to
explain the Holocaust; instead, it was the Nazi commitment to extermi-
nate Jews that generated a justificatory racist ideology.x20
On the other hand, for some of the witnesses, antisemitism was too
particularized to explain the full range of Nazi crimes. Focusing on medi-
cal experimentation and slave labor, historian Genevieve De Gaulle sug-
gested that scientific rationality and greed had produced the Nazi machin-
ery of death.12' 'Racism' could explain Nazi crimes for so many people
because of its indeterminacy. To some, it represented an antisemitism that
threatened only Jews; to others, it stood for a social Darwinism that
threatened the humanity of all.
These tensions became explicit when representatives of Jewish victims
objected to the French judiciary's decision that Barbie could be charged
with crimes against non-Jewish Resistance members. "We're confusing
two different types of crimes," complained the President of Lyons' Jewish
community. "Jews weren't opponents. They didn't fight.' 22 "There can
be no comparison between the plight of the Resistance and the genocide of
the Jews," agreed civil prosecutor George Bermann.2 3 Mixing the two,
Simone Weil feared, would "trivialize the Holocaust," and "reduce" the
Nazis' guilt.' 24
Resistance veterans saw this attitude as parochial. Confining Nazi guilt
to Jewish victims, they felt, would reduce its global significance. "Nazi
ideology was an attack on all humanity," insisted Resistance attorney Joe
Nordmann. 1 5 According to Nordmann, members of the Resistance were
(NEXIS). So strongly was racial prejudice identified with mass murder at the trial that civil prosecu-
tor Sylvia Zimmerman pointed to the discriminatory Nuremberg laws as evidence that Barbie must
have known of the impending extermination of the Jews, an argument that reflects poorly on those
Jews who ignored such warning signs. Rosemberg, Nazi Horrors Aided by French Antisemitism,
Lawy'er Says, Reuters, June 19, 1987 (NEXIS).
120. See Y. BAUER, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 35-36 (1978); Fackenheim,
Foreword to Y. BAUER, THE JEWISH EMERGENCE FROM POWERLESSNESS at vii-ix (1979);
Friedlaender, The Historical Significance of the Holocaust, 1 JERUSALEM Q. 36-59 (1976).
121. See Rosemberg, supra note 4; Rosemberg, supra note 118. De Gaulle is the niece of the
General and Premier.
122. Echikson, French Ask Who Is on Trial: Barbie or Resistance?, Christian Sci. Monitor, May
28, 1987, at 9. This argument echoed those offered in the Court of Appeals decision that upheld the
Investigating Magistrate's decision to discontinue the charges involving atrocities against Resisters. See
supra text accompanying notes 98 & 100.
123. Lyon, Reuters, May 9, 1987 (NEXIS).
124. Bernstein, supra note 115.
125. Rosemberg, Nazi Horrors Aided by French Antisemitism, Lawyer Says, Reuters, June 19,
1987 (NEXIS).
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less soldiers than martyrs, persecuted for their anti-Nazi beliefs. 28 For
former Resistance leader Claude Bourdet, the Barbie prosecution repre-
sented a long awaited recognition of this martyrdom. "There's been a
huge amount of propaganda over the past few years to convince people
that only Jews were killed by the Nazis," Bourdet complained.127
3. The Ambiguity of French Nationalism: Resistance or Nazism?
Another dimension of controversy hidden by the representation of Na-
zism as racism concerned the degree of French complicity in Nazi crimes.
Although antisemitism had long flourished in France, it had rarely been
expressed in terms of the kind of systematic pseudo-science of race devel-
oped by the Nazis. 2 ' Attorneys for the Jewish plaintiffs were insistent
that the focus on Nazi ideology not obscure French complicity in the Hol-
ocaust. "By isolating . . .Jews," Vichy legislation "made it easy for the
Germans to identify them," attorney Michel Zaoui recalled.' 29 "We are
therefore entitled to ask that those Frenchmen who collaborated in this
policy be also put on trial and convicted for crimes against humanity,"
added Alain Levy, attorney for a Jewish victim.' 30
Not surprisingly, the French government was less anxious to indict
France. When Socialist President Mitterand and his Guevarist adviser
Regis Debray brought Barbie from Bolivia, their aim was not to expose
collaboration but to rekindle French identification with the predominantly
leftist Resistance. Nevertheless, opposition politicians worried that the
trial might provide an occasion for embarrassing the French right with
charges of collaboration.13 1
Upon regaining control of the government in 1986, however, the con-
servative parties inherited the responsibility of prosecuting Barbie.'32
They responded by contending that the Resistance was not a leftist cause,
but a French cause. The French showed "an increasingly strong and gen-
eral opposition to the occupier," and "there were no traitors in the Resis-
tance," testified the conservative National Assembly President, Jacques
Chaban-Delmas. 33 "France will be acquitted before the tribunal of the
126. See Echikson, supra note 122.
127. Hotel Terminus, supra note 32.
128. See R. RUBENSTEIN & J. ROTH, APPROACHES TO AUSCHWITZ 69, 182 (1987).
129. Theolleyre, Barbie Trial Hears Catalogue of French Antisemitism, Manchester Guardian
Weekly, June 28, 1987, at 11.
130. Id.
131. See Mosby, Barbie, UPI, Feb. 8, 1983 (NEXIS) (statement of Francois Leotard).
132. The election of Mitterand in 1981 precipitated the formation of France's first left-wing cabi-
net in 23 years. In September 1983, however, a conservative coalition gained a majority in the Senate.
In March of 1986, a similar coalition gained control of the National Assembly, requiring Mitterand
to ask the conservative Jacques Chirac to form a cabinet, an anomalous situation described as "cohab-
itation." EUROPA Y.B. 1034-35 (1988).
133. Rosemberg, French Need Not Blush Over War Record, Former Premier Says, Reuters,
June 11, 1987 (NEXIS).
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world," the former Resistance leader predicted.13" ' The subtext was that
because all French had resisted, the French left had no unique authority
to represent France.
The ruling conservative coalition did not emerge from the Barbie trial
unbesmirched, however. A week into the trial, Gaullist foreign trade min-
ister Michel Noir precipitated a crisis by urging that the government re-
pudiate the right-wing National Front party. Citing the National Front's
racist rhetoric and opposition to North African immigration, Noir com-
pared it to Nazism on Le Monde's front page. The lesson of the Barbie
trial, he argued, was that the government should risk losing the next elec-
tion rather than its "soul."1 ' This alarm over the growing influence of
right-wing racism in French politics found expression in one civil prosecu-
tor's summation,1 8 and in much of the trial's press coverage. 3 Com-
menting on the trial, a conservative German daily warned readers, "The
French susceptibility for leftist ideology disguises a tendency toward fas-
cism that showed itself not only in the 1930's." 3 ' In prosecuting Nazism,
France's conservative government failed to exonerate itself before the tri-
bunal of the world.
4. Israel as Prosecutor
France was not the only state that sought to justify itself by prosecuting
Nazism at Barbie's trial. Claiming jurisdiction to prosecute Nazi crimes
committed in any part of the world, the Israeli government first contem-
plated requesting Barbie's extradition and then offered to assist the
French prosecution. 9 Receiving no public response to this offer, Israel
sent Ambassador Ovadiah Sofer to the trial during the summations.
Speaking on the courthouse steps, Sofer told reporters that "terrorists are
today's Nazis and SS. They create chaos and destabilize. They massacre
non-combatants, preferably Jews, and innocent people, women and chil-
134. French Hope Barbie Trial Will Not Become Trial of Their History, UPI, May 12, 1987
(NEXIS).
135. Lewis, Barbie Is a Specter in a Cabinet Rift in France, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987, at All,
col. 1 (late city final ed.). Noir's father was a concentration camp inmate.
Throughout 1987, Prime Minister Chirac attempted to unify his conservative coalition in anticipa-
tion of his 1988 campaign for presidency. In the month preceding Barbie's trial, Chirae's coalition
introduced legislation eroding the right to citizenship of children of immigrants, in an effort to hold
the nativist National Front in the coalition. In the two months following the trial, leaders of the
Conservative coalition's two largest parties announced that they would not support Chirac's presiden-
tial campaign. EUROPA Y.B. 1035 (1988).
136. Rosemberg, Nazi Horrors Aided by French Antisemitism, Lawyer Says, Reuters, June 19,
1987 (NEXIS) (statement of Christian Charriere-Bournazel, attorney for Marcel Gompel's widow).
137. See, e.g., The Barbie Trial: Not Just Vengeance, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at A30, col. 1
(late city final ed.); All our Barbies, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987, at 18.
138. McCartney, West Germans Note Barbie, Waldheim Forcing Others to Face Nazi Past,
Wash. Post, May 23, 1987, at 1-32 (quoting Die Welt).
139. Immanuel, Israelis Offer to Help Prosecute Barbie," AP, Feb. 6, 1983 (NEXIS) see supra
note 84 (Israeli assertion of universal jurisdiction in Eichman judgment).
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dren. They dream, like the SS . . . of a world without justice, a world
without liberty, a world enslaved."14
Such self-serving hyperbole is the unfortunate consequence of viewing
Nazi crimes, not as a discrete set of historical circumstances in which
Klaus Barbie played a role, but as an ideology which Barbie merely
represented.
B. Nazi Crimes and Jewish Identity
1. What's Wrong with Representing Nazism
The images of Nazism offered by Barbie's prosecutors distorted the
complex causation of crimes committed in the name of Nazism. These
crimes were made possible by the convergence of ideology, expedience,
technology, bureaucracy, economic depression, and the immigration poli-
cies of many nations."" The attribution of Nazi crimes to an ideology
marshals eleven million dead for and against ideas that could never, by
themselves, have killed or saved anyone. In addition, the prosecution of
Nazi ideology attributes more consistency to Nazi thought and Nazi pur-
poses than may be appropriate. The less confidence people feel in the
coherence of their own purposes and principles, the more they may be
tempted to identify themselves by contrast to a Nazi ideology they see as
easily defined and totally evil. The irony is that Nazism provided an iden-
tity for many confused and rootless Germans only by attributing a simi-
larly malignant coherence of purpose to Jews.1 42 Where once Nazis
sought solidarity in the suppression of an imagined Jewish conspiracy,
contemporary Jews are tempted to build their communities on the con-
demnation of remembered Nazi atrocity. This subsection argues that this
development is unfortunate.
Self-definitions derived principally from the conduct of an oppressor do
140. Israeli Ambassador Compares Nazi to Terrorists, UPI, June 22, 1987 (NEXIS).
141. An emerging view among Holocaust historians is that the no single cause can explain the
Holocaust. Diverse, inconsistent and opportunistic, Nazi ideology appeared in response to the socio-
economic crises of the interwar years and developed in dialectical interaction with the vagaries of
politics and war. Arno Mayer has recently argued that antisemitism assumed central importance in
Nazi ideology, shouldering aside antimarxism, only with the Nazi rise to power. Richard Rubenstein
and John Roth have stressed that antisemitism has often led to persecution and expulsion of Jews
without yielding systematic extermination. Both studies agree that Nazi antisemitism initially took
this form; that the unwillingness of Western governments to accept Jewish refugees, whether caused
by antisemitism or economic depression, helped route Nazi policy toward "the final solution;" and
that the route was paved by the same "advances" in technology and bureaucracy that mobilized other
wartime powers. Mayer adds that the German defeat on the Eastern front sped Jews toward their
fate. See generally A. MAYER, WHY DID THE HEAVENS NOT DARKEN? THE FINAL SOLUTION IN
HISTORY (1988); R. RUBENSTEIN & J. RoTH, APPROACHES TO AUSCHwrrz (1987).
142. See A. MAYER, supra note 141, at 92-109 (identifying social origins of German Fascism
among economically displaced petty bourgeoisie; describing efforts of Nazi propagandists to provide
lower middle class with collective identity defined in opposition to a single enemy; describing Hitler's
strategy of attributing inconsistent qualities to that enemy, while stressing the enemy group's solidar-
ity and racial purity).
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not articulate for what the self stands. In representing themselves primar-
ily as victims, people affirm no distinctive ethos of their own. At the same
time they appear to envy the oppressor for having an identifying ethos,
even if that ethos is wrong. Hence a disturbing element of self-contempt
can be found in identities defined by contrast to Nazism. Too often, repre-
sentations of Nazism are constructed to support representations of self that
are self-effacing and hence also self-defeating.
The futility of efforts to define Judaism by reference to Nazism illus-
trates this problem. Deriving Jewish identity from the Holocaust effaces
Jewish particularity by assimilating Judaism to the sacrificial symbolism
of Christianity. The following discussion suggests that international war
crimes prosecutions are too embedded in the universalistic values of Chris-
tianity to permit the assertion of Jewish identity. It proceeds to criticize
the highly influential Holocaust theology of prosecution witness Elie
Wiesel for encouraging Jews to mourn Jewish identity as a casualty of
the Holocaust. It concludes with a warning that Holocaust-centered con-
ceptions of Jewish identity can impoverish Jewish ethical life by reducing
it to the single dimension of survival. In sum, this subsection argues that
Jews should not use the prosecution of Nazi war crimes as an occasion for
defining group identity. Stressing Jewish victimhood neither gives voice to
Jewish particularity nor provides Jewish communities with ethical
guidance.
2. Jewish Victims, Christian Symbols
A sacrificial culture assigns God a voracious appetite for violence that
can only be sated as the result of a trick, a substitution. In the judicial
culture formed by God's covenant with Abraham it is human sacrifice-a
slaughter of the innocent, compounded by deceit-that is the ultimate
crime.'"
Christian culture is organized around the sacrificial symbolism of the
Crucifixion. Seeing an infinite disjunction between the human world of
symbols and the divine world of meanings, Christianity despairs of hu-
manity's capacity to justify itself before God. Hence it can only be re-
deemed as a result of a sacrificial substitution. 144
But Jewish culture is judicial rather than sacrificial. Seeing divine ordi-
nance as fully expressed in scripture, Judaism sees human obligation as
rigorous, but finite. Seeing each individual as capable of justifying herself
143. See generally R. GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 1-38 (P. Gregory trans. 1972) (dis-
tinction between sacrificial and judicial culture). From Girard's essentially Christian persepctive, all
culture is fundamentally sacrificial and deceitful. Judicial culture is doubly deceitful because it hides
its truly sacrificial nature. See J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCrION 29 (1982) (characterization of
Girard as Christian religious thinker).
144. GIRARD, supra note 143, at 259 (necessity of sacrifice for salvation); see also 0. PATTER-
SON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 70-71 (1982) (divine sacrifice redeems Christians from slavery to
sin).
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before God, it rejects sacrifice as unnecessary. Judaism believes that God
does not suffer by being nailed down in writing. Accordingly, the transub-
stantiation of Jewish victims into sacrificial symbols is at odds with Jew-
ish culture.
As a result, the Barbie trial's controversy between Jewish survivors and
Resistance veterans over Nazism's meaning reflects a deeper conflict of
cultures that makes the Nazi war crimes trial an inhospitable forum for
the definition of Jewish identity.
The Barbie trial's symbolism was more sacrificial than judicial. The
prosecutors often emphasized the victims' innocence more than the defend-
ant's guilt-hence the insistence of Jewish groups that the Jews alone did
not resist, countered by the claims of Resistance veterans that their com-
rades were persecuted for their beliefs rather than their actions. By claim-
ing the millions as martyrs, these groups interpreted the Holocaust as the
vast sacrifice that would finally redeem the world from violence. The
Barbie trial was a dramatic reenactment of the Holocaust in which the
dead died, not in vain, but for our moral instruction.1"" From a Christian
perspective, this use of the dead as a sacrifical symbol may be legitimate;
but Jews should greet this redemption of irredeemable suffering with
ambivalence.
Jews have sought vigorous prosecution of Nazi war crimes as an affir-
mation that Christian civilization has finally repudiated antisemitism. Yet
Christians can repudiate antisemitism simply by being too polite to notice
that anyone is a Jew. Jews have therefore insisted on acceptance of the
Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish experience, in the hope that Christian
civilization would reject antisemitism while also valuing Jewish particu-
larity. Identifying value with universality, 46 however, Christian civiliza-
tion values particulars only as symbols with universal significance. Such a
culture can only respond to Jewish demands for recognition by transform-
ing the Jew from universal scapegoat to universal martyr. Hence Jews
cannot accept the recognition offered them by Christian civilization with-
out sacrificing their particularity.
This was the issue underlying the Barbie trial's debate over what dis-
tinguished Nazi crimes as unique. Many observers-Jewish and gen-
tile-have offered explanations of Nazi crimes that assimilate them to
other events in human history. Accordingly, the Nazis' mass murder has
145. Michael Berenbaum argues that sacrificial themes are implicit in the guilt-ridden veneration
of the victims found in much Jewish response to the Holocaust. See M. BERENBAUM, VISION OF THE
VOID (1979). See also A. MAYER, supra note 141, at 16 (term "Holocaust" denotes sacrificial offer-
ing; criticizes "cult of remembrance"). For an example of a sacrifical theology of the Holocaust, see I.
MAYBAUM, THE FACE OF GOD AFTER AuscHwrrz (1965).
146. See J. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 80-82 (1971) (tension between exclusive
value of universal in medieval Christian thought and need to explain particular events); see also A.
LOVEjOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1936) (tension between exclusive value of the abstract in
Western civilization, and belief in divine creation of worldly particulars).
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been variously attributed to monopoly capitalism,147 "totalitarian" bu-
reaucracy,148 lawlessness, 1 49 phobic anti-communism, 1 50 sexual repres-
sion,'15  racism,"' nationalism, 15  and paganism.1 5' Other schol-
ars-primarily, but not exclusively, Jewish-have responded that the
murder of six million Jews, although carried out alongside the murder of
five million gentiles, is historically unique. Signifying this uniqueness by
the term "Holocaust," these scholars generally argue that no other reli-
gious or ethnic group has ever been targeted for total and unconditional
extermination. Hence these "Holocaust" interpreters distinguish Nazi
crimes on the basis of both the identity of the victims and the methods and
motives of the perpetrators. 5
Who is the audience for this claim of uniqueness, and what is its mean-
ing? The claim of uniqueness is directed to gentiles and implies the au-
thority of the universalistic values it appears to challenge. The insistence
that the Holocaust is unique implies that it was not only different from
other suffering, but more significant.1 56 Now for Jews the Holocaust is of
unique importance, not because it was unlike other suffering, but simply
because it happened to Jews. The claim that the Holocaust is objectively
unique has a wider audience: It is designed to interest the gentile world in
Jewish suffering. If the Holocaust is objectively unique, then its unique
significance is universally recognizable. Seen in ths light, the Holocaust
becomes a uniquely accessible emblem of Judaism, because appreciating
its Jewishness does not depend upon identifying as a Jew. Accordingly,
the claim of objective uniqueness denies that there is a uniquely Jewish
perspective from which the Holocaust is especially meaningful.
This convergence of uniqueness and universality is implicit in the Nu-
remberg Tribunal's characterization of the Holocaust as a "crime against
humanity." This novel formulation establishes retroactive liability, often
147. See F. NEUMANN, BEHEmoTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM
(2d ed. 1944).
148. H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1966); R. HILBERG, THE DESTRuCTION
OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1985).
149. G. KREN & L. RAPPOPORT, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE CRISIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1981); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958); Lewis, Foreign Affairs: A Model of French Justice, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1987, at 31, col. 1
(late city final ed.).
150. E. NOLTE, THREE FACES OF FASCISM (1966).
151. W. REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM (1970).
152. S. CHOROVER, FROM GENSESIS TO GENOCIDE (1979); R. LIrFON, THE NAZI DOCTORS:
MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986).
153. L. KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM (1957).
154. E. ROSENSTOCK-HuEssY, THE CHRISTIAN FUTURE 73, 160 (1966).
155. E. FACKENHEIM, THE JEWISH RETURN INTO HISTORY: REFLECTIONS IN THE AGE OF
AUSCHWITZ AND A NEW JERUSALEM (1978); Friedlaender, On the Possibility of the Holocaust, in
THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Y. Bauer, ed 1978); Eckhardt & Eckhardt, The
Holocaust and the Enigma of Uniqueness, 450 ANNALS 165 (1980). See A. MAYER, supra note 141,
at 15-17 (describing and criticizing conception of historical "uniqueness" and sacrificial symbolism
implicit in use of term "Holocaust").
156. Wyschogrod, Faith and the Holocaust, 26 JUDAISM 286, 292 (1977).
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justified on the grounds that Nazi crimes were unprecedented. 5 7 Like the
victims, jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity wanders across
borders, uniquely ubiquitous, uniquely homeless. A crime against human-
ity harms a victim because of her unique origins or beliefs; yet the interest
harmed is always the victim's universality, her "humanity." According to
the Nuremberg formula, when a Jew is killed because of her Jewishness,
it is not her Jewishness that is attacked. To the contrary, it is this exces-
sive attention to her Jewishness that dehumanizes her. In short, to view
her as nothing more than a Jew is to see her as less than human.151
Constrained by its own universalistic morality from recognizing the
uniqueness of Nazism's victims, Western culture has understood Jews to
be making a claim for the extremity of their suffering. Such a claim com-
mands attention because all suffering has universal significance in Christi-
anity. No longer persecuted for killing Christ, the Jew may now find a
place in Christian culture as a Christ symbol in whose death every Chris-
tian dies and is reborn.159
It would be unfair to expect Christian culture to interpret the Holo-
caust outside of a Christian framework of values and symbols. But it is
important for Jews to remember that international war crimes trials are
addressed to gentiles and framed by Christian culture. When Jews iden-
tify themselves in terms of the suffering imposed upon Jews by gentiles,
they give up just what identifies them as Jewish. "A theology of suffering,
endemic to other religious traditions, is foreign to Judaism," argues
Deborah Lipstadt in criticizing what some see as an overemphasis of the
Holocaust in American Jewish life.'6 Sacrificial symbolism represents
Jewish particularity in terms that efface it.
Why then has the Holocaust become the basic token of Jewish identity
in the postwar world? When that world reassures Jews that they are no
different from anybody else, they are tempted to insist that they cannot
help being different, that persecution has made them different. Behind
this pose of frustrated assimilationist lies the anxiety that assimilation is
already an accomplished fact, the fear that the Holocaust annihilated not
only Jews, but the Jewish world. If Jews bitterly embrace the Holocaust
157. Ryu & Silving, International Criminal Law-A Search for Meaning, in I A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 22, 27-28; Tornaritis, The Individual as a
Subject of International Law and International Criminal Responsibility, id. at 103, 108.
158. By contrast to the Nuremberg and Barbie trials, Eichman was charged not only with "crimes
against humanity," but also with "crimes against the Jewish People." Nazi Collaborators (Punish-
ment) Law (5710-1950, No. 64, 4 Laws of the State of Israel 154). The Eichman judgment, however,
characterized "crimes against the Jewish people" as "the gravest type of 'crime against humanity.'" I
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 528 (quoting judgment),
159. Representations of the Jewish victim in American popular culture have sometimes suggested
that the real suffering of the Jews lies in an inability to accept spiritual rebirth as Christians. See
Avisar, Christian Ideology and Jewish Genocide in American Holocaust Movies, in 3 HOLOCAUST
STrDIES ANNUAL 21-42 (1985) (discussion of The Mortal Storm).
160. Lipstadt, Invoking the Holocaust, 30 JUDAISM 335, 339 (1981); see also Alter, Deformations
of the Holocaust, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1981, at 48.
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as an identity, that may be because, in its own wake, the Holocaust is the
only specific Jewish legacy left to them."6' This contradiction lies at the
heart of the Holocaust theology promoted by star prosecution witness Elie
Wiesel.
3. Judaism as Witness: The Holocaust Theology of Elie Wiesel
No one has stressed the perils of representing the Holocaust more than
survivor and author Elie Wiesel;' 62 and yet, for many, no one represents
the Holocaust more than Wiesel. Wiesel accepts this total identification
with the Holocaust, referring to his tortured memory as "my entire being,
what I am."1" Memory of the dead weighs upon him so heavily that
Wiesel can identify little of himself as his own. In one of Wiesel's novels,
a survivor describes the possession of his soul by the memory of the dead:
'I' had remained over there in the kingdom of night, a prisoner of
the dead. The living person . . . I thought myself to be . . . was
nothing more than an echo of voices long since extinguished, nothing
more than a shadow stumbling against other shadows whom I was
cheating and betraying day after day, as I forged ahead. I thought I
was living my own life, I was only inventing it.'"
Haunted by memory, Wiesel views his own survival as deceitful, his ac-
tual life as a novelist as invented, his literary inventions as not his own,
but merely the voices of the dead.165
Wiesel's modesty by no means diminishes the powerful presence of his
personality in his writing. Wiesel endures little loss of identity in subordi-
nating himself to his characters because everyone recognizes that his abdi-
cation of authorship is part of the fiction. Hence his self-effacement is an
authentic expression of identity precisely because it is his own literary
invention. Wiesel's selflessness is a fictional character, but also a signa-
ture, a nom de plume.
Unfortunately, Wiesel imposes this self-effacing identity on other Jews.
Wiesel's studied humility has gained him enormous authority within the
Jewish community to tell others how to identify as Jews; and what he
tells them is that they too must be occupied by the memory of the dead.
According to Wiesel, all Jews are identified by memory: "If we stop re-
membering, we stop being."'16 Memory of the Holocaust, in particular, is
161. I take it as an example of the difficulty of asserting Jewish identity in a universalistic culture
shared by Jews and gentiles alike, that I have been persuaded to refer to Jews as "they" rather than
"we" throughout this Commentary, lest the readers of this Journal be misled into believing that they
are all Jewish.
162. E. WIESEL, A Plea for the Survivors, in A JEw TODAY (1978).
163. 1 E. WIESEL, supra note 1, at 239.
164. E. WIESEL, A BEGGAR IN JERUSALEM 159-60 (1970).
165. See 2 E. WIESEL, supra note 1, at 117-18.
166. Id. at 368.
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crucial to Jewish identity: "No Jew can be fully Jewish today. . . with-
out being part of the Holocaust. '6 7 Thus, Wiesel represented the Holo-
caust at the Barbie trial because "to be a Jew today. . . is to testify."1 8
Accordingly, Wiesel insists that the burden of incarnating the dead is not
his alone: "All Jews are survivors."''6
Wiesel's identification of Judaism with the memory of the Holocaust
explains his enigmatic statement at the Barbie trial that he testified to
"prevent the killer from killing a second time.' 1 70 Certainly he wished to
prevent the Nazis from compounding their crime by denying that any
crime occurred."71 And certainly he wished to keep the dead alive in mem-
ory. But in so doing he also sought to preserve the living as Jews. Inspired
by Wiesel, the influential Jewish theologian Emil Fackenheim has
claimed that the memory of Auschwitz forbids us from "handing Hitler
any more posthumous victories" by abandoning Judaism." 2 But for
Wiesel, Judaism cannot be removed from the Eastern European milieu in
which it flourished and died before his eyes. Perhaps convinced that Jew-
ish identity cannot survive the destruction of these traditional communi-
ties, Wiesel sees the memory of that destruction as the postwar Jew's only
link to Judaism. Defining Judaism as the memory of Auschwitz, Wiesel
seeks to preserve Judaism by embalming living Jews with the identities of
the dead.
Wiesel's necrolatry is a response to this sense that the Holocaust
threatened not only Jews, but the validity of Judaism. The most memora-
ble passage in Wiesel's writing, describing his first encounter with the
crematoria, is punctuated by this lament: "Never shall I forget those
flames which consumed my faith forever."1 3
Auschwitz could consume Wiesel's faith in God because it evidenced
God's infidelity to the Jewish people. The God worshipped by the Jews
of Eastern Europe operated in history under obligations defined by the
covenant with His chosen people. In that covenant He promised to protect
them in return for faith and obedience-but to punish them harshly for
disobedience or infidelity. The orthodox theological response to persecu-
tion and suffering among Jews was therefore to see it as punishment for
167. Id. at 252.
168. E. WIESEL, ONE GENERATION AFTER 24 (1970).
169. 2 E. WIESEL, supra note 1, at 305.
170. Rosemberg, Wiesel Addresses Barbie Trial, Clashes Erupt, Reuters, June 2, 1987
(NEXIS).
171. Wiesel Sees Holocaust Coverup, UPI, June 3, 1987 (NEXIS). Wiesel referred at the Barbie
trial to neo-Nazi "historians" who argue not only that no Jews were gassed, but that most of those
killed never existed. See, e.g., A. Burz, HOAX OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1976); P. RA.SINIER,
DEBUNKING THE GENOCIDE MYTH (1978).
172. E. FACKENHEIM, supra note 155, at v, 4 (influence of Wiesel acknowledged).
173. E. WIESEL, NIGHT 4 (1969).
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deviation that would be removed and redeemed by greater religious
commitment.7 4
For Wiesel, however, the Holocaust cannot be accounted for within this
covenantal orthodoxy. No Jewish sin could possibly justify the magnitude
of the punishment and no future bounty could possibly redeem it. God's
apparent willingness to dispense with His people showed not anger, but
indifference. Thus, as far as Wiesel is concerned, if God exists, He has
broken the covenant binding the Jews to him. 175
Faced with God's infidelity, the controversial theologian Richard Ru-
benstein has decreed that after the Holocaust we live in a time of the
death of God, in which the Jewish religion is of questionable relevance.17 6
Despite his acknowledgment that Auschwitz consumed his faith, Wiesel
has rejected Rubenstein's approach, because, with Emil Fackenheim, he
feels that to abandon Judaism is to betray the dead. Rather than aban-
doning Judaism, Wiesel substitutes the Holocaust for God as the focus of
Jewish identity.1 7
In Wiesel's liturgy, the Holocaust takes on some of the traditional at-
tributes of God. "Auschwitz is ... the end of creation. Its mystery is
doomed to stay whole, inviolate.' 7 Holocaust victims, in particular, have
replaced God as inexpressably sacred. Accordingly, despite the Jewish ob-
ligation to testify about persecution, it is blasphemy to discuss the vic-
tims. 17 1 In Wiesel's play, The Trial of God, a pogrom survivor is not
afraid to name God as the author of Jewish suffering, yet he refuses to
name the daughter whose torture he helplessly witnessed.' Wiesel pre-
serves the covenantal framework by substituting Holocaust victims for
God as the Jewish people's covenantal partner.' 8
Thus, Wiesel replaces a God who can be satisfied by righteous action
with human victims whose suffering Jews can never redeem or live up to.
Yet gentiles, outside of the covenant, can be redeemed by Jewish suffer-
ing: "If we wish to save the world it can only be by opening this secret
and painful door to our common memory," Wiesel testified at the trial.8 2
Hence, Jewish identity consists in having endured persecution in order to
174. R. RUBENSTEIN & J. ROTH, supra note 141, at 301.
175. Wiesel,Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future, 16 JUDAISM 281-85 (1967). See gener-
ally M. BERENBAUM, supra note 188, at 152-80 (1979) (analysis of Wiesel's response to this
problem).
176. See generally R. RUBENSTEIN, AFTER AUSCHWITZ (1966); RUBENSTEIN & ROTH, supra
note 141, at 308-16; M. BERENBAUM, supra note 145, at 160-71.
177. See I. ABRAHAMSON, Introduction Essay, in AGAINST SILENCE: THE VOICE AND VISION OF
ELIE WIESEL (Wiesel measures everything, including God, against Holocaust).
178. E. WIESEL, supra note 162, at 198.
179. Id. at 189-93, 186-87, 197, 204.
180. E. WIFSEL, THE TRIAL OF GOD 44 (1979).
181. See M. BERENBAUM, supra note 145, at 127, 157-58 (for Wiesel, memory of dead replaces
God as partner in covenant).
182. Rosemberg, supra note 170.
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teach the persecutors a lesson."" 3 Wiesel asks Jews to accept the identity
persecution has inscribed upon their people's tombstone in hopes that hu-
manity will accept this memorial as the tablet of its law. The difficulty is
that such an identity violates Wiesel's own injunction against letting the
enemies of Judaism define it.18' If Jews can no longer believe they were
chosen by God, must they value their selection by Hitler? In Wiesel's
Holocaust theology, Jewish identity is represented by the annihilation of
Jews. This sacrificial identity is also a sacrifice of identity, which is why
Holocaust theology can seem so appealing. It is tempting for Jews to view
their particularity as imposed by persecution because that relieves them of
the burden of imposing it upon themselves. Defining themselves as sacrifi-
cial victims can win Jews a place in Christian culture as objects of pity, as
Christians unredeemed by grace. But in return they give up the ethical
obligations of Judaism. Renting Shoah,'85 they can suffer safely in their
living rooms, and learn that after the Holocaust one need do nothing to
remain a Jew.
4. The Political Context of Holocaust Judaism
The Holocaust became the focus of American Jewish identity after the
Six Day War of June 1967. The "miraculous" Israeli victory in the face
of what many Jews perceived as a renewed threat of extermination in-
spired the influential Holocaust theology of Emil Fackenheim, an acceler-
ating interest in Holocaust education, and eventually, the formation of the
United States Holocaust Memorial Council, with Wiesel at its head."8 '
Thus interest in the Holocaust arose already embedded in what theolo-
gian Jacob Neusner has called "the Myth of Holocaust and Redemption,"
in which Israel is valued both as a lesson learned from the Holocaust and
as a guarantee against its future repetition.187 For American Jews, the
1967 war dramatized this myth because it seemed to replay the Holocaust
with a different ending.'88
Richard Rubenstein claimed before the Six Day War that American
Jews could not confront the Holocaust without risking their identity and
183. E. WIESEL, supra note 162, at 182-83 (in killing all Jews, Christians kill Christ and endan-
ger themselves).
184. "'[T]he Jew can only be defined in his relationship to himself. Subject and not object, he is
an end in himself, and not a function of what rejects him or of what he is not.'" Lamont, Elie Wiesel;
In Search of a Tongue in CONFRONTING THE HOLOCAUST 96-97 (A. Rosenfeld & I. Greenberg eds.
1978) (quoting Wiesel); see also E. WIEsEL, supra note 1, at 297.
185. Shoah (Paramount Home Video, 1985).
186. J. NEUSNER, STRANGER AT HOME: "THE HOLOCAUST," ZIONISM, AND AMERICAN JUDA-
ISM (1981); 1 E. WIEsEL, supra note 1, at 149-95.
187. J. NEUSNER, supra note 186, at 1.
188. See E. FACKENHEIM, supra note 155, at 108-09, 130; E. WIESEL, A BEGGAR IN JERUSA-
LEM 244 (1970) (expressing this sentiment); cf. B. AvISHAI, THE TRAGEDY OF ZIONISM 350-53
(1985) (noting and criticizing this sentiment).
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faith.'8 9 Yet the Holocaust became a central symbol of Jewish identity
after Israeli conquest had purged its memory of the shame of victimhood
and the threat of extermination. With victory, the Holocaust became a
useful justification for the morally uncomfortable position of occupier in
which Israel found itself. In addition, victory popularized the "lesson"
that Jews must do whatever is necessary to ensure their survival, lest they
"hand Hitler posthumous victories."' 90
This lesson impoverishes Jewish politics. Israel is a Jewish polity, the
very purpose of which is to discriminate on the basis of religion in com-
posing its membership.1 91 Holocaust Judaism teaches that such a state is
necessary to insure that Jews will always have a refuge from antisemit-
ism. The difficulty is that Holocaust Judaism provides no compelling rea-
son to be Jewish. If Jews can escape persecution by assimilating-by es-
caping Judaism-then they need no such refuge. Only if there is some
distinctive ethical value to Judaism is it morally imperative that Jews be
guaranteed survival as a culture and community.
In the covenantal tradition, ethical obligation has been central to Jew-
ish identity, albeit coupled with a faith that God would reward compli-
ance by making the Jews a great nation. That the Holocaust indicates
God's absence from history need not release Jews from their commitment
to pursue righteousness. Instead, the Jewish community can carry out
both sides of the covenant, claiming the obligation to define Jewish values
189. R. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 176.
190. E. FACKENHEIM, supra note 155, at 4.
191. Israel's Declaration of Independence characterizes Israel as "the Jewish state in Eretz Yis-
rael, which would open wide the gates of the homeland to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish
people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations. . . .The State of Israel will
be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles." B. AVISHAI, supra note 188,
at 178 (quoting Israeli Declaration of Independence). The Israeli Knesset established no constitution
upon its founding, but passed a series of basic laws that continued the Jewish Agency's policies of
favoring Jewish settlement, including The Law of Return, conferring citizenship on any Jew desiring
to immigrate, and The Law of Lands of Israel, forbidding the alienation of public land to any gentile.
Id. at 187-89. Nevertheless, Bernard Avishai has offered a subtle argument that Israel need not be
conceived as essentially discriminatory, or even Zionist. Avishai's overall argument is that Zionism
was a transitional movement aimed at establishing a Jewish cultural and political community in Pal-
estine for a variety of reasons. A state was neither necessary nor sufficient for this goal. Once estab-
lished, such a community has a right to self-determination that can find expression in a state, but no
more so than Arab communities. And the resulting states need not discriminate. Avishai points to the
claim in the Declaration of Independence that Israel will "ensure the complete equality of social and
political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex; it will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture . . . it will be faithful to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations," id. at 178, and notes the tension between these rights and the charac-
terization of Israel as a Jewish state. Id. at 184. He stresses the tolerant, democratic ideals of the
cultural Zionist and labor Zionist currents that he views as the mainstream of the movement up to
Israel's founding, id. at 23, 49-98, while acknowledging that labor Zionist support for unrestricted
residence in Palestine was premised on the expectation that it would ultimately lead to a Jewish
majority. Id. at 92. He argues that since Israel adopted no constitution, the institutionalization of pre-
independence discrimination need not be viewed as constitutive of Israel's identity, and notes that the
constitutional language proposed upon independence would have forbade such discrimination in the
name of Jewish values. Id. at 184-89. Further complicating the issue it should be noted that the
Israeli Declaration of Independence also invokes the Holocaust as a justification for establishing a
Jewish state.
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and realize them in history as its own rather than God's. Unlike Holo-
caust Judaism, a conception of Judaism as a distinctive nomos can justify
Judaism's realization in an intrinsically Jewish polity. But such a polity
would be constrained to preserve its utopian purpose as well as its people.
By contrast, the interpretation of the Holocaust as the justification for
Israel debases both. The myth of "Holocaust and Redemption" insults the
dead and corrupts the living, because no compensation is sufficient to rec-
tify the Holocaust. It reassures Israelis, and teaches Palestinians, that past
oppression justifies future oppression. Jewish values antedate the Holo-
caust, and a major goal of Zionism was to create a self-determining politi-
cal community in which those values could be realized independent of Eu-
ropean oppression.192 Jews did not need the Holocaust to learn
neighborliness, nor does the Holocaust justify them in forgetting it.
Accordingly, Israel does not realize its purpose merely by surviving, nor
does a single-minded devotion to Jewish survival ensure the survival of
Jewish values. If anything, the devotion of Jews to community has some-
times militated against individual survival, leading to the accusation that
Jewish victims have passively accepted persecution. 193 Before Barbie's
trial, one journalist charged that the children of Izieu could have been
saved had they been dispersed in Christian homes instead of housed con-
spicuously together." 4 Such accusations ignore the courage of Jews deter-
mined to share the fate of their families and communities.19 5 Consider the
halting trial testimony of Leah Feldblum, who taught at Izieu because "I
have always taken care of children."1 9' She accompanied the children to
the camps where "they burned them all," she recalled. "Two of them I
took by the hand, the sky was red, it was night ...the children were
frightened.' 197 Armed with false identity papers, she could have passed as
a gentile, and so escaped: "I don't want to make myself out like a heroine,
but I loved. . . .A three year old child came up to me. . . .I am a
kindergarten teacher. . . .So I said to the man. . . .I am Leah Feld-
blum!"' l s This was no act of martyrdom, but a simple expression of self.
She did not adopt this identity out of defiance, nor, when it proved costly
192. For the range of utopian visions of Jewish community that found expression in Zionism, see
generally S. AVINERI, THE MAKING OF MODERN ZIONISM: INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE JEWISH
STATE (1981); B. AVISHAI, supra note 188; J. FRANKEL, PROPHECY AND POLITICS: SOCIALISM,
NATIONALISM AND THE RUSSIAN JEWS 1862-1917 (1981); A. HERTZBERG, THE ZIONIST IDEA
(1959); N. LEVIN, "WHILE MESSIAH TARRIED": JEWISH SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS 1871-1917
(1977).
193. H. ARENDT, EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 111 (1963)
(wartime Jewish leaders eased Nazi's task by allowing Jews to be ghettoized).
194. Meisler, Letters From Jewish Children May Return to Haunt 'Butcher of Lyon,' L.A.
Times, Jan. 20, 1985, at 16 (home ed.) (quoting Maurice Rajsfus).
195. See Y. BAUER, THE JEWISH EMERGENCE FROM POWERLESSNESS (1979).
196. Ophuls, Klaus Barbie's Circus of Evil, 244 THE NATION 884, 886 (1987).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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to her survival, did she give it up. Leah Feldblum needed no Holocaust to
know who she was.
III. REPRESENTING OCCUPATION
Like ancient religious traditions, revolutionary movements lose their
moral bearings when they identify themselves in terms of their enemies.
The advocacy of Barbie's radical defense attorney Jacques Verges can be
criticized on these grounds. By condemning colonialism and Nazism as
equally reprehensible, Verges misrepresented Barbie; but by cynically dis-
missing all politics as hypocrisy, Verges also misrepresented the national
liberation movements for which he purported to speak. National liberation
movements cannot credibly object to foreign domination without identify-
ing some values as authentically their own.
A. Representing a Nazi
1. The Fugitive Client
Verges easily displaced his client as the trial's chief villain. Figura-
tively, Barbie remained a fugitive even after his arrest. Realizing that his
accusers would not condemn him without defining him, Barbie resisted
identification: "The word Nazi doesn't exist," he told an interviewer on
the plane to France. "Can you tell me what is a Nazi?"' 99 Nazism,
Barbie seemed to feel, was too profound to be discussed before an unso-
phisticated audience. "Just what are the ideals you feel were betrayed?"
asked Judge Cerdini at the trial.200 "If Herr President wants to discuss
these issues with me personally, I am of course at his disposal," replied
Barbie courteously, "but I must warn him that it will take a little time. I
can't be expected to deliver a lecture here on National Socialism. '2 0' 1
Barbie seemed determined not to reveal himself. The only explanation he
would ever offer the court for his activity in Lyons was that "At the time
I had hierarchical chiefs and I did my duty under the orders of my superi-
ors." °2 Barbie then announced his intention of boycotting the trial, in
terms that also portrayed him as an object acted upon by others: "If I find
myself here today it is because I have been illegally expelled. . . . It is
therefore up to my lawyer to defend me. . . . The trial may follow its
course. The witnesses may come. But I shall not be present. . . . I will be
represented by my lawyer. ' 20 3 Thereafter, for most observers, Nazism
was represented by Barbie's controversial attorney, Jacques Verges.
199. Hotel Terminus, supra note 32.
200. Ophuls, supra note 196.
201. Id.
202. Rosemberg, Barbie Walks Out of Nazi War Crime Trial, Says He's Kidnap Victim, Reuters,
May 14, 1987 (NEXIS).
203. Id.
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2. Vergs as Nazi
A Resistance veteran and avowed anticolonialist, Verges shocked
France by undertaking the defense of a Nazi. Verges attributes his an-
ticolonialism and antiracism to his origins: his father lost a promising ca7
reer in the French diplomatic service as a result of marrying Verges'
Vietnamese mother. A Resistance fighter and Communist Party official in
his youth, Verges first came to public notice for his defense of Algerian
rebels. Marrying one of these clients, Vergs took the surname "Man-
sour" and embraced Islam. He later edited a Maoist journal that pub-
lished some of Regis Debray's Bolivian dispatches. Verges defended a
number of Palestinians accused of terrorism, before mysteriously disap-
pearing for most of the 1970s. °4
The author of several books on the political role of the criminal defense
attorney,205 Vergs is known for his effective use of the media as a forum
for his controversial clients' views. Because of this reputation, an angry
public interpreted Verges' decision to defend Barbie as an endorsement of
Barbie's political views. Some ominously noted Verges' youthful friend-
ship with Pol Pot, perhaps attributing to him a catholic taste in mass
murderers.20 6 Others associated his anti-Zionism with antisemitism, or
speculated that his fee was paid by a pro-Nazi financier.207 Interpreting
Marcel Ophuls' film on Barbie, The New York Times' James Markham
wrote: "The cigar-puffing Mr. Vergs .. .makes the point for Mr.
Ophuls that the extreme of Nazism and anti-semitism comes full circle
and touches the other extreme of anti-colonial leftism.' '20  Finally, some
saw signs of Nazism in Verges' tactics and demeanor. The Resistance
leader Raymond Aubrac, arrested with Jean Moulin, thought Verges "a
good lawyer for Barbie. . . they share the same behavior and philoso-
phy. ' 2 9 Civil prosecutor Serge Klarsfeld was "delighted that Barbie's
lawyer speaks. . . his client's language. ' 210
What prosecutors found truly annoying, however, was that Verges did
not resist their condemnation of Nazism. Instead, he deployed his client's
authority as a Nazi in support of his own definition of Nazism. According
204. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 229-30; A. CASSESE, supra note 162, at 113; Rosemberg,
Barbie's Lawyer, From Guerilla Gun-Running to Nazi's Defence, Reuters, May 11, 1987 (NEXIS);
Andriotikis, In France, When a Terrorist Needs a Lawyer, Jacques Vergis Usually Gets the Call,
PEOPLE, March 9, 1987, at 109 (NEXIS).
205. DkPENSE POLITIQUE, supra note 86; J. VERGks, DE LA STRATEGIE JUDICIARE (1968); J.
VERGiS, PouR EN FINIR AvEc PONCE PILATE (1983) [hereinafter PILATE].
206. Rosemberg, supra note 204; Holland, Jacques Verges: Barbie's Lawyer is a Mystery Man,
UPI, May 13, 1987 (NEXIS).
207. MacIver and Lewis, Standing up for Barbie, MACLEAN'S, May 25, 1987, at 41 (paraphras-
ing Serge Klarsfeld and philosopher Bernard Henry-Levy); A. CASSESE, supra note 28, at 115 (spec-
ulation that Verges' fee was paid by allegedly pro-Nazi Francois Genoud).
208. J. MARKHAM, Marcel Ophuls on Barbie; Reopening Wounds of War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
1988, at 21, col. 1 (late city final ed.).
209. Holland, Defense Witnesses Appear, UPI, June 15, 1987 (NEXIS).
210. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 230.
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to Verges, Nazism was an example of Western imperialism, accepted by
France during the Occupation and replicated by France during its Alge-
rian and Vietnamese wars.
3. Vergs as Ironist
Vergs' political agenda did not prevent him from playing his role as
defense attorney by raising doubts about the prosecution's procedure and
evidence. Yet even these seemingly routine arguments were couched in
terms that suggested Western complicity in or recapitulation of Nazi
crimes. In denying that Barbie had participated in the Final Solution, for
example, Vergs noted the embarrassing failure of French prosecutors to
charge him with any killings or deportations of Jews at his earlier tri-
als.2"' This could not be taken seriously as evidence of Barbie's innocence,
but it suggested French indifference toward the fate of the Jews.
This point was underscored by another of Barbie's evidentiary argu-
ments. One of the prosecution's most important pieces of evidence was a
telex, sent by Barbie, reporting the Izieu roundup to his superiors. A copy
of this telex was presented by the French prosecutor at Nuremberg in
1946. Yet in preparing Barbie's previous prosecutions the French govern-
ment had ignored this damning evidence of Barbie's complicity in the ex-
termination of Jews.212 Vergs sought to have the telex excluded as a for-
gery. While admitting its probable authenticity, he argued that anyone
might have typed Barbie's name onto it.211
Vergs persisted in claiming that the telex had been fabricated even
after Serge Klarsfeld discovered the copy bearing Barbie's original signa-
ture,214 prompting one of the trial's strangest incidents. As the telex was
being passed among the attorneys, Judge Cerdini asked Verges to remove
its plastic cover. Klarsfeld immediately lept to his feet to protest Vergs'
being permitted to handle the precious document. "I don't have 'dirty
hands,' " quipped Verg&s, in reference to Sartre's play about collaboration
of the same title.21 5 "I didn't say that your own hands were stained,"
responded a confused Klarsfeld. "But with you, words always have a dif-
ferent meaning. '216 And Verges' words did have a "different" meaning.
His purpose in constantly harping on the telex was not to discredit it, to
efface or besmirch it, as Klarsfeld feared. It was not Verges, after all,
211. Ulbrich, Prosecutors Seek to Make Barbie Trial a Condemnation of Nazism, AP, Apr. 25,
1987 (NEXIS).
212. T. BowER, supra note 18, at 166; see supra notes 35, 56 and accompanying text (discussing
previous trials).
213. Morgan, Voices from the Barbie Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2 1987, § 6, at 20, col. 1
(NEXIS); J. VERGs, LA FAcE CAcHfE Du PRocks BARBIE 19 (1983).
214. Nazi Hunter Klarsfeld Says He Has Found Important Document, AP, Feb. 17, 1987
(NEXIS); Holland, supra note 209; Bernstein, supra note 7.
215. J. SARTRE, Dirty Hands, in THREE PLAys (L. Abel, trans. 1949).
216. Bernstein, supra note 115; Morgan, supra note 213.
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whom the telex accused, but the French who had failed to prosecute
Barbie for the crime the telex reported.
Verges further shamed the prosecution on this score with a deft proce-
dural argument. Shortly after the trial commenced, Verges asked the court
to dismiss all the charges on the grounds of double jeopardy, urging that
the 1954 verdict of the military tribunal was so vague that it "covered the
entire criminal operation of the SD of Lyons."2 7 In response, state prose-
cutor Pierre Truche was forced to argue that the two previous convictions
were "only for the facts we were aware of," implying that the Izieu de-
portation was unknown at the time. 218 Verges placed him in the dilemma
of either conceding the double jeopardy argument or acknowledging post-
war France's indifference to crimes against the Jews.
Other technical arguments enabled Vergs to liken any informality or
inconsistency in Barbie's prosecution to Nazi lawlessness. Arguing that
Barbie's deportation from Bolivia to France was not in accord with forms
of extradition recognized in French law, Vergs said, "Fighting Nazism
with the methods of Nazis only gives Hitler a posthumous victory."21" 9
Vergs framed his argument that Barbie's prosecution was unconstitution-
ally retroactive in similar terms.220 At the trial, Vergs characterized such
retroactive liability as reflecting "Nazi-like thinking.)2 2 1
Like Vergs' claim that the telex was forged, his references to the
"Nazi-like" retroactivity of the prosecution had a "different," or ironic
meaning. This is revealed in a published defense of his decision to accept
the Barbie case. 2 In this work, Vergs argues that the legislature could
not have intended the law of 1964225 to establish or extend liability retro-
actively for crimes against humanity because that would have subjected
French army officers to liability for committing atrocities during the Alge-
rian revolution.22M Here the irony of Verg&s' position emerges-he is
characterizing the French state as Nazi-like, not for prosecuting Barbie
retroactively, but for failing to retroactively prosecute its own officers.22 5
217. Judgment of June 3, 1988, Cass. Orim. Fr. (No. 87-84.240, LEXIS) (D. Bacardi trans.)
(quoting Verg&s) (on file with author); Rosemberg, Barbie Denied He Masterminded Persecution of
Jews, Reuters, May 12, 1987 (NEXIS).
218. Id.
219. Nazi War Criminal's Lawyer Plans Bolivian Trip, AP, June 19, 1983 (NEXIS). Investi-
gating Magistrate Christian Riss denied a petition for release relying on this argument shortly after
his arrest. See Judge Refuses To Free Nazi War Criminal, AP, June 10, 1983 (NEXIS). Verges'
arguments were ultimately rejected by the Cour de Cassation, see supra note 82 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, Verges repeated in his summation that the "extradition" of Barbie was "in the
tradition of Berlin." Holland, Barbie, UPI, July 2, 1987 (NEXIS).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
221. Meisler, French Accused of Nazi-like Thinking for Prosecuting Barbie, L.A. Times, July 3,
1987, § 1, at 6, col. 1 (home ed.).
222. J. VERGgS, supra note 213, at 13 (associating retroactivity with repressions of Vichy
regime).
223. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
224. J. VERGgS, supra note 213, at 35-36.
225. Such prosecution would have enabled the French state to "authoritatively disavow" the
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Verges' evidentiary and technical arguments were servants of his rhe-
torical strategy. The goals of that strategy were to link the two themes of
collaboration and colonialism in recent French history.
4. Vergs as Provocateur
The first step in Verges' program of accusing France was the publica-
tion of a book, in the fall of 1983, which claimed that Moulin was be-
trayed to Barbie as the result of an elaborate conspiracy.22 The charge
that treachery was widespread among the upper echelons of the Resis-
tance, from which postwar France drew its leadership, stirred controversy
and created apprehension that Barbie might substantiate or even expand
Vergs' charges at his trial.22 Hence it generated a wider audience for
Barbie's trial while deflecting attention from his crimes. If France was
interested in Barbie primarily because of Moulin, they would be promised
a real show. Vergs suggested that the government might delay the trial
indefinitely for fear of what Barbie would reveal concerning Moulin's
fate.22
8
But preventing a trial was far from Verges' purpose. He wanted a trial,
not to vindicate Barbie, but as a forum for his own views. On the eve of
the trial, Verges was still promising a trial that would once and for all
destroy the myth that "the entire nation had fought to rout the occupa-
tion. ' '229 Yet Verges could not have intended to keep this promise. Even
before Verges took over the case, it appeared that Barbie actually
remembered little about the events of that time.23" By February of 1983, it
was already clear that Moulin's death would not be among the crimes
against humanity charged to Barbie.231 Moreover, before the trial, Resis-
tance leaders accused by Verges won libel judgments against Vergs and
another proponent of his conspiracy theory.232
atrocities that Vergs sought to characterize as Nazi-like. See J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING
5 (1970) on this and other symbolic uses of punishment.
226. According to Vergs' account, Combat, one of the Resistance forces, was taking money and
orders from the American OSS (Office of Strategic Services), against De Gaulle's wishes. Moulin, as
De Gaulle's representative, attempted to put a stop to this, earning the enmity of Combat's leadership.
Believing that Rene Hardy had become Barbie's agent, they nevertheless insisted that he be allowed to
attend the "secret" meeting at which Moulin was captured by Barbie. Vergs also implicates Ray-
mond Aubrac, who attended the meeting for the Liberation group and was later freed by his wife in a
daring rescue. He supplies no motive for this alleged treachery, however. PILATE, supra note 205, at
25-38.
227. Bell, French Resistance Hero Betrayed by Comrades, Lawyer Says, Reuters, Nov. 13, 1983
(NEXIS); French Scorn Allegations That Resistance Hero Was Betrayed, Reuters, Nov. 14, 1983
(NEXIS); Ulbrich, The Trial of Klaus Barbie Is Not the Trial of a Man, AP, Dec. 10, 1983
(NEXIS).
228. Meisler, supra note 221.
229. Rosemberg, Trial to Focus on Collaboration With Nazis, Lawyer Says, Reuters, April 30,
1987 (NEXIS).
230. T. BOWER, supra note 18, at 226.
231. See id. at 2.
232. See Judgment of Oct. 22, 1985, Bull Civ. I, Fr. (No. 4711 A/M LEXIS).
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When Barbie announced his decision to boycott the trial, it became
clear that no revelations would come from his lips. While Verges ex-
pressed disappointment in Barbie's decision, it seems likely that Verges
instigated it.2 33 Other clients have cleared the field for Vergs by absent-
ing themselves from their own trials, notably Lebanese guerrilla Georges
Ibrahim Abdallah;234 and in an early work on political trials, Vergs
quoted Lenin's advice that it is sometimes better to "boycott the
tribunal. 213 5
Judge Cerdini prevented Vergts from cross-examining prosecution wit-
nesses on the Moulin affair.2"6 Vergs acquiesced, and offered no testi-
mony to support his conspiracy theory.281 7 Vergs' summation accused
Jewish leaders deported by Barbie to their deaths of collaboration, 3 8 but
said nothing about Resistance complicity in Moulin's capture. To a great
extent, Verg&s' controversial charges against the Resistance proved to be
part of a bait-and-switch strategy. Once he had attracted his audience, he
wanted to talk about something else.
5. Vergs as Prosecutor
What Verges wanted to shift the world's attention to was the criminal-
ity of colonialism. "France officially had 200,000 deaths during the Ger-
man occupation for 40 million inhabitants. Algeria had during the French
repression one million deaths for nine million inhabitants," Verges told
the press as the trial opened. 3' Initially, Vergs presented French colonial
repression as a natural extension of French collaboration in Nazi repres-
sion: "The French officials of today are attempting to make us believe that
barbarity stopped in 1945, and that they ended it," he explained. "I do
not want to allow this." '24 If French leaders could collaborate in atrocities
against their own citizens, why would they shrink from atrocity against
their colonial subjects?
Ultimately, however, Verges needed the French public to maintain its
233. Rosemberg, supra note 202.
234. Rodriguez, Guerrilla Suspect Quits Trial After Tirade Against France, U.S., Reuters, Feb.
23, 1987 (NEXIS).
235. D9FENSE PoLmrrQuE, supra note 86, at 64.
236. Cerdini's rationale was that the Moulin affair was the subject of a separate civil suit pending
against Barbie. See Barbie's Judge Deflects Testimony of French Collaboration, UPI, June 12, 1987
(NEXIS).
237. The only witness Vergis called who had personal knowledge of the Moulin affair was the
hostile Raymond Aubrac. Rosemberg, Barbie Lawyer in Tactics Switch, Judge Halts Anti-French
Attack, Reuters, June 16, 1987 (NEXIS).
238. Meisler, supra note 221. Hannah Arendt made a similar charge in the wake of Eichmann's
trial. See H. ARENDT, supra note 193, at 111 (1963).
239. Holland, supra note 209. Undoubtedly many of the Jewish civil plaintiffs felt that Verges
was making the wrong comparison in counting France's entire population. One-third of the quarter
million Jews in France in 1940 were killed, two-thirds of the nine million Jews of Europe.
240. Bortin, One year After Return, Gestapo Chief is No Closer to Trial, Reuters, Feb. 3, 1984
(NEXIS).
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reverence for the Resistance, because his condemnation of French coloni-
alism turned on an analogy between the French Resistance and the Alge-
rian resistance. "I don't see how the French government can give amnesty
for crimes against humanity committed in Algeria ...by French of-
ficers," Vergs argued, "and at the same time declare that crimes against
humanity committed by German officers in France are not subject to the
statute of limitations. ' 241 If one equates German crimes with the Final
Solution, Verg&s' question is easily answered: The French army, like most
of history's brutes, only killed whomever they could not control, whereas
the Germans preferred murder to domination. Verg&s' analogy between
France's Occupation and Algeria's, therefore, turned on highlighting the
martyrdom of the Resistance and obscuring the annihilation of the Jews.
Seen in this light, the Nazis were imperialists and their great crime was
the brutal suppression of a struggle for national self-determination. And
seen in this light, removed from its context within the Final Solution,
France's ordeal was mild compared to Algeria's.
For Vergts to offer his analogy of Nazism and French colonialism at
the Barbie trial, it was crucial that Barbie be perceived primarily as an
opponent of the Resistance. This was a principal reason why the defense
kept the public's attention focused on Barbie's role in the Moulin affair
until the last minute. This also helps explain another curious decision on
the part of Verg&s: When a Paris appeals court expanded Barbie's charges
to include atrocities against Resistance members in July of 1986, Vergts
declined to appeal., 42 Vergs wanted Barbie charged with crimes against
the French Resistance so that he could charge France with crimes against
Algerian revolutionaries.
In pursuit of this goal, Vergs brought suit against the French govern-
ment on behalf of relatives of two Algerians allegedly tortured to death by
French troops.24 3 Predictably, the suit was dismissed on the grounds that
atrocities committed during the Algerian revolution were covered by an
amnesty. Vergs then called one of the Algerian plaintiffs as a defense
witness at the Barbie trial to make his point concerning the inconsistency
of French law.2 4 Verges called additional witnesses to testify in support
of his analogy between atrocities in occupied France and in colonized Al-
geria, but their testimony was severely truncated by Judge Cerdini.24 5
Unrestricted by Cerdini during his summation, Verges ignored the
241. Ulbrich, supra note 211.
242. Theolleyre, supra note 102. Probably there was little to be gained by appealing, however,
given that the appeals court had followed the guidance of the Cour de Cassation in its Judgment of
Dec. 20, 1985, supra note 56. One might even argue that the appeals court did not broaden the
charges as much as the higher court might have wished.
243. Rodriguez, Barbie's Lawyer wants Mitterand Adviser to Testify, Reuters, May 7, 1987
(NEXIS); Bernstein, Six Witnesses Take the Stand in Barbie's Defense, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1987,
at A13, col. I (city ed.).
244. Id.
245. Holland, Defense Witnesses Appear, UPI, June 15, 1987 (NEXIS).
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Moulin affair and concentrated on the Algerian uprising. "Do crimes
against humanity only merit the name when they are committed against
Europeans?" he asked.246 Beginning with a symbolic "bow" to the chil-
dren of Izieu, he recalled Africans killed by the Nazis in the defense of
France and compared them to Algerian World War II veterans killed by
the French during the Algerian revolution: "Is it also in their names that
you are going to judge Barbie? '2 , 7 Concluding with a description of the
massacre of 15,000 Algerians in the town of Setif, Vergs asked, "Why
would some . . . be the touching victims of crimes against humanity,
while others fall into anonymity, victims of regrettable mistakes?"'248
Verg&s' efforts to deflect the Court's attention onto the sufferings of the
Third World were broadened by the summations of two colleagues.
Apartheid, argued Congolese attorney Jean-Martin M'Bemba, "is the
most virulent form of Nazism today."249 Algerian lawyer Nabil Bouaita
attributed what he called "Palestinian genocide" to the "Nazification of
the Jewish-Israeli people." Repeating an analogy introduced by Verges in
cross-examining Wiesel, Bouaita condemned Israel's 1982 invasion of
Lebanon as a holocaust: "There is no difference between the man who
lights the fire in the crematorium and the pilot who pushes the button to
release an incendiary bomb. Is it by this derisory difference that civiliza-
tion is measured? 2 5
0
6. The Prosecution of Verges
For the attorneys representing Barbie's Jewish victims, Bouaita's sum-
mation was the last straw. Already anxious that the prosecution of
Barbie's crimes against the Resistance might deflect attention from his
role in the Holocaust,251 they found Verges' comparison between Nazism
and colonialism "an insupportable insult. ' 252 But where the identification
of colonialism with Nazism merely dispossessed Jews of the Holocaust,
the identification of Israel with Nazism seemed to turn the Holocaust
against Jews. "This is extremely grave and intolerable," shouted Jewish
victims' attorney Michel Zaoui, unleashing pandemonium in the court-
room.25 3 The following day leaders of Lyons' Jewish community
246. Higgins, Defense Challenges France's Right to Try Former Nazi Barbie, Reuters, July 1,
1987 (NEXIS); Cody, 3rd World Invoked in Barbie Trial; Crimes Continuing Says Defense Team,
Wash. Post, July 2, 1987, at A23, col. 1 (final ed.).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Higgins, Barbie Trial Disrupted as Tempers Flare During Defense Plea, Reuters, July 1,
1987 (NEXIS); Rosemberg, Barbie's New African Lawyer Says Nazi Crimes Like Colonialism,
Reuters, June 18, 1987 (NEXIS).
250. Holland, Barbie, UPI, July 2, 1987 (NEXIS); Higgins, supra note 246; Rosemberg, Wiesel
Addresses Barbie Trial: Clashes Erupt, Reuters, June 2, 1987 (NEXIS).
251. Lyon, Reuters, May 9, 1987 (NEXIS).
252. Holland, supra note 245 (quoting Charles Kormann).
253. Higgins, supra note 246.
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threatened to swear out a complaint against Bouaita for the crime of "pro-
moting racial hatred.)2 54
Even those attorneys and observers who did not regard Verges' rhetori-
cal strategy as an insult, dismissed it as a smokescreen. "The defense is
going to talk about things Barbie is not charged with in order to cause
distraction," warned Charles Libman, one of the civil prosecutors. 55
Before Vergfs presented his case, State Prosecutor Pierre Truche warned
the jury that the defense attorney would ignore the case against his client.
Instead, protested Truche, Verges would attempt a "defense by devia-
tion," that would "displace the focus of this trial. '256 Agreeing that
Verges' case against colonialism and Zionism was irrelevant, Judge
Cerdini prevented Vergs from putting it before the jury.251 7
Verges' analogies between Nazism, colonialism and Zionism may well
have been offensive. But the charge that they were irrelevant was hypo-
critical. Vergs was criticized for offering three witnesses who claimed no
knowledge of Barbie's actions during the war. Yet the prosecution offered
"scores" of witnesses with no such knowledge.258 Verges' arguments con-
cerned the meaning of Nazism, which was, after all, the central issue ad-
dressed by the prosecution and its legion of expert witnesses.
Consider the irate Michel Zaoui's own summation, during which he
chastised Verges for spreading "rumors" about collaboration and colonial-
ist crimes. "The Jews also were the butt of rumors that they wanted to
rule the world with their greed for profit," he told the jury. "Your con-
demnation of Barbie will serve as a rampart against such rumors, based
on lies and inexactitude. . . we must preserve the memory of what took
place for this memory can serve to prevent evil."'2 59 If Verges' analogy
between colonial massacres and the Holocaust is hyperbolic, how much
more so is Zaoui's analogy between Verges' innuendo and the Holocaust?
If Verges demanded an acquittal because of the alleged crimes of the pros-
ecuting state, Zaoui demanded a conviction because of the alleged Nazism
of the defense attorney. Verges equated any unjust killing with Nazism
while Zaoui equated any false witness with Nazism. Each was guilty of
exploiting and trivializing Nazi crimes for his own rhetorical purposes;
254. Holland, supra note 250.
255. Ulbrich, supra note 211.
256. Rosemberg, Prosecutor Attacks Barbie's Lawyer for Sidestepping at Trial, Reuters, June
15, 1987 (NEXIS).
257. To some observers, Vergs' analogies between Nazi crimes and other wrongs missed the
whole point of a criminal prosecution. "The tactic," explained survivor and stateswoman Simone
Weil, "is to show that everything that ever happened. . . is the same. Everybody is guilty, so nobody
is guilty." Bernstein, supra note 115. "It's an entirely crazy proposition," argued former Resistance
leader Claude Bourdet. "If you read it this way, you could never have any trial against any criminal,
anywhere." Holland, supra note 250.
258. See Rosemberg, supra note 256.
259. Rosemberg, Nazi Horrors Aided by French Antisemitism, Lawyer Says, Reuters, June 19,
1987 (NEXIS).
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but because Zaoui's purpose was to bear false witness against Verges, he
was guilty, in addition, of hypocrisy.
B. Representation as Occupation
The prosecution's complaint that Verges distracted attention from the
trial's legal issues must be dismissed as hypocritical. This subsection ar-
gues that Verges is more justly criticized on his own terms, as a political
advocate for anticolonial resistance. Verg&s' highly publicized characteri-
zation of the French Resistance as a sham exemplified cynical assump-
tions that cast doubt on the authenticity of anticolonialist resistance as
well. Vergs' decision to represent a Nazi reflects this disillusionment: un-
able to respect the authenticity of his clients, he now occupies his clients
for purposes that are not their own. Worse still, Verges subordinates his
clients to values in which even he no longer believes.
1. Authenticity and Occupation
The Occupation was a galvanizing period that brought together the in-
tellectual currents of existentialism and Marxism. Prewar existentialists,
like postwar Jews, were disillusioned theists in search of a civil reli-
gion.26° Political values were already embedded in their disillusionment
with Christianity, because institutional French Catholicism was tradition-
ally antirepublican and antisemitic.6 1 Nevertheless, prewar existentialists
were without a politics of their own. They responded to the sanctimonious
pieties of the French right by adopting a politically empty posture of ni-
hilism. Existentialists inhabited a godless cosmos which could only be
given normative meaning by an act of human will. Accordingly, left-lean-
ing existentialists needed a cause for their political instincts to be trans-
formed into the commitments that could structure a moral universe.26 2
The Occupation provided this opportunity. Joining the beleaguered
communists in their self-defense, existentialists began to find in Marxism
a civil religion that could justify sacrifice.263 An impotent fringe before the
war, France's intellectual left found itself, at war's end, perhaps the only
political force in France untainted by collaboration.26 4
The strange result is that there are two quite different stories that one
can tell about this period. One emphasizes the political identity of post-
war France with the Resistance. This is a story of courage and commit-
ment, of the triumph of unambiguous good over clear evil. In such a con-
text, one need only respond "authentically" to one's feelings of right and
260. Wiesel was especially influenced by Camus. Lamont, Elie Wiesel; In Search of a Tongue, in
CONFRONTING THE HOLOCAUST 88-96 (A. Rosenfeld & I. Greenberg eds. 1978).
261. R. RUBENSTEIN & J. ROTH, supra note 141, at 69-70, 74-77.
262. W. BARRETT, IRRATIONAL MAN 239-41 (1962) (quoting at length from J. Sartre).
263. M. POSTER, EXISTENTIAL MARXISM IN POSTWAR FRANCE 75-79, 109 (1975).
264. Id. at 36-38.
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wrong to have clean hands.265 The authentic patriot, then, was the rare
individual who preserved the autonomy of her moral judgment against
foreign occupation. During the Occupation, such heroic individuals were
able to find moral absolutes in a godless world. Because this story presents
individuals and groups as creators of meaning, it exemplifies the "human-
ism" often attributed to the existential Marxists. 26
The other story emphasizes the political identity of wartime France
with the collaborationist Vichy regime. If one emphasizes the ubiquity of
collaboration, one tells a story of small souls confined by morally ambigu-
ous circumstances. From this perspective, the humanism of the existential
Marxists is at best naive, and possibly corrupt. Human beings are not
"subjects" of history, they are history's objects.267 Individuality is associ-
ated not with the moral autonomy of conscience, but with the corruptibil-
ity of self-interest. Because this story portrays human beings as passive
recipients of meaning, it supports the "anti-humanism" often attributed to
structuralists and post-structuralists. 2 "8 Human values and choices are
dictated by culture, rather than the other way around, say the structural-
ists. And for post-structuralists, culture is always hopelessly deceitful and
contradictory. From these perspectives, the "authenticity" prized by exis-
tential Marxists is not possible.
This is the terrain in which Verges wages his "judicial warfare." His
arguments deliberately exploit this tension between idealism and cynicism
that is the legacy of the Occupation to French popular culture. On the one
hand, the French state, claiming descent from the Resistance, presents it-
self as the embodiment of humanity, courage and principle. On the other
hand, the French people find it reassuring to discover that the world is a
complicated place in which everyone is more or less corrupt and fraudu-
lent. Verges sets out to expose inauthenticity in a culture that simultane-
ously despises, expects, and enjoys it. While Verges exploits this contra-
diction in French culture, he also exemplifies it. Moving from the
humanist rhetoric of existential Marxism to the antihumanist rhetoric of
structuralism and post-structuralism, Vergs' arguments reflect the
French New Left's growing ambivalence concerning the concept of cul-
tural authenticity.
The situation that gave birth to the French New Left in the late 1950's
was the Algerian revolution. After a decade of political and moral confu-
265. Id. at 77-78.
266. Id. at 68, 105, 125-29, 243; K. SOPER, HUMANISM AND ANTI-HUMANISM 42-48, 54-74
(1986).
267. Solomon, supra note 12 (describing memoir of "nouveau roman" author Alain Robbe-Gril-
let, whose work is admired by structuralists for eschewing intention, motivation and emotion).
268. M. POSTER supra note 263, at 324-26, 335-36, 340, 343, 354; K. SOPER, supra note 266,
at 85-90, 96-115. See C. LUvi-STRAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 254 (1962) (critiquing French Left's
belief that humans choose their history).
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sion prompted by the inconsistencies of Stalinism,"" progressive intellec-
tuals coalesced in a protest against colonial repression that evoked the
unity and moral certainty of the Resistance.2 70 For the French New Left,
the French presence in Algeria was an Occupation, and the brutal French
repression invited comparisons with the Holocaust.
27
'
In this context, the French Communist Party was discredited by its
Stalinism and lack of support for anticolonialist revolution. Verges quit
the party in 1957 "over the colonial question.1272 With the party's de-
cline, the central figure of the French New Left became Jean-Paul Sartre,
whose stress on authenticity and commitment lent inspiration to Third
World leftists.273 Most important among these was Frantz Fanon, a theo-
rist of the Algerian revolution and admirer of the young Verges.27' In The
Wretched of the Earth, Fanon offered an existentialist psychology of au-
thenticity and alienation to explain 'colonialism-particularly in Alge-
ria-as the foreign occupation of the culture and psyche of the colo-
nized.275 Fanon's thought influenced Che Guevara, who interpreted the
improbable success of the Cuban revolution as a testament to humanity's
freedom to interpret and change its conditions. Existential Marxism was
appealing to those who, like Fanon and Guevara, saw national liberation
as entailing the awakening of subjectivity, those who understood revolu-
tion as the heroic quest for identity rather than the rational pursuit of
interest.2 7' To those who found their individual identities in a collective
struggle, the potential tension between personal and culutural authenticity
was not yet visible.
Representing Algerian revolutionaries in this intellectual milieu, Verges
saw the political lawyer as a mouthpiece for the authentic voice of the
oppressed. Hence the political lawyer had to gain a hearing for the
"human truth" of the political defendant.277 This involved revealing not
only the social conditions that compelled the client's act of resistance, but
269. M. POSTER, supra note 263, at 109-87; K. SOPER, supra note 266, at 79-85.
270. M. POSTER, supra note 263, at 186.
271. Alain Resnais' much admired 1950's film on the deathcamps, NIGHT AND FOG, keeps the
national identities of perpetrators and victims in soft focus. "The whole point," Resnais has explained,
"was Algeria." Krantz, Alain Resnais' Nuit et Brouillard, in 3 HOLOCAUST STUDIES ANNUAL 107,
116 (S. Pinsker & J. Fischel eds. 1985).
272. Hotel Terminus, supra note 32 (interview with Verges).
273. M. PosTER, supra note 263, at 186-87.
274. F. FANON, TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION 75 (H. Chevalier, trans. 1967) (on
Verges). Fanon anticipated some of Verge' later arguments by criticizing the French Left for at-
tempting to portray colonialism as contrary to traditionally French values. Id. at 83.
275. F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1961). This book contains an enthusiastic
preface by Sartre.
276. See Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1, 2, 10-11
(1987) (discussing voluntarist and psychological themes in Guevara's theories). While Geuvara makes
no explicit references to existentialism, his work reflects the influence of Fanon. See S. Liss, MARX-
iST THOUGHT IN LATIN AMERICA 257. For a voluntarist interpretation of Guevara's thought, see R.
DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION (1967) and R. DEBRAY, CHE's GUERRILLA WAR
(1975).
277. DErENsE POLITIQUE, supra note 86, at 15.
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the client's subjective values as well. The political lawyer's "duty is to
help preserve the honor and dignity of his client . . . [T]he accused's con-
ception of his honor may be in absolute contradiction with the morals of
his judges. The defense must help the judges overcome this 'wall of in-
comprehensibility.' 278 The political lawyer's role, therefore, was to help
clients justify their resistance by articulating a distinctive standard of
justice.27 9
Vergs saw such a defense as a form of resistance because he saw the
silencing of the voice of the oppressed as a significant part of their oppres-
sion. "Silence is the supreme form of psychological warfare . . . [w]e
must break the silence of the prisons and their dossiers." '28 The trial pro-
vided a rare opportunity to speak, which "the European resistance against
Hitler" lacked: "In the void behind closed doors, the struggle against tor-
ture and death continued-but the forum was lacking and so that struggle
could not find voice."2 But through the courtroom, "a few cries have
pierced the night and fog of the camps that have consumed two million
Algerians." '282 Hence it was part of the resister's duty to speak in her own
defense. 2 3
The attorney, by contrast, had to be self-effacing, supporting the client's
views rather than speaking her own, or those that would win the court's
favor. Vergs denied that such a defense increased the client's risks, argu-
ing that sensational publicity protects a political defendant from arbitrary
treatment.28 4 Regardless of the merits of this claim, it is significant that
Vergs defended political advocacy as consistent with an ethic of treating
the client as an end in herself. Up to this point, Verges advocated the
client's politics in order to represent the client authentically, rather than
use the client as the means to represent a political cause. At the close of
the Algerian revolution, Verg&s' conception of the political lawyer's role
was circumscribed by the humanism then prevalent in the French New
Left.
2. Culture as Occupation
Paradoxically, the success of Marxist humanism was its own downfall.
The disaffection with dialectical materialism that had created space for
existential Marxism in Europe and the Third World forced the Soviet
278. Id. at 26, (quoting Pierre Stibbe).
279. Id. at 60.
280. Id. at 59-60.
281. Id. at 35-36.
282. Id.
283. Id. 35-41 (Obligation of those who appear in court is to give voice to those who suffer in
obscurity and to make use of a forum made available by struggle and protest. Purpose of such testi-
mony is not to elicit pity from enemies or third parties, but to inspire one's comrades with hope.
Hence, political defendant emphasizes goals of struggle, not its cost.).
284. Id. at 67-75.
1989] 1367
The Yale Law Journal
Union to unveil its own official version of Marxist humanism. The
emerging Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960's, however, prompted the
Chinese Communist Party to attack the new humanism as bourgeois revi-
sionism."' Suddenly, the ideology most associated with national liberation
was being condemned by the original prototype for all national liberation
movements.
While the official Chinese propaganda of the early 1960's was as vacu-
ous as the Soviet slogans it attacked, Sartre's version of Marxist human-
ism was in fact poorly adapted to movements modeled on the Chinese
revolution. Chinese revolutionaries had aimed to mobilize existing com-
munities rather than to fuse atomized individuals into a movement. Be-
cause they sought to realize indigenous agrarian socialist traditions, they
foreswore the cosmopolitan cities in favor of guerrilla warfare in the coun-
tryside. Hence, Mao's theoretical writings envisioned each nation pursu-
ing an idiosyncratic pattern of development towards communism, in reali-
zation of its own distinctive culture.2 86 The authenticity Maoism pursued
was cultural authenticity, not personal authenticity.
Because Maoists saw identity as culturally rather than individually de-
termined, they could not accept the existential Marxist vision of individu-
als freely creating their own identities. Reflecting the individualism of
Western culture, existential Marxism was easily seen as a form of cul-
tural imperialism. In addition, Maoists were inclined to see the existential
Marxist emphasis on unconstrained subjectivity as a bourgeois concern
that obscured class conflict. Existential Marxism seemed excessively con-
cerned with the oppression of the wealthy, trapped in alienating roles and
burdened with material objects.
These two weaknesses were exposed in an attack on existential Marx-
ism launched by structuralists Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser
that coincided with the official Chinese polemic generated by the Sino-
Soviet split. Levi-Strauss argued that human consciousness was condi-
tioned and structured by culture.28" This meant that human nature was
neither universal nor individual and that the Western admiration for
"subjectivity" was merely a cultural artifact of no universal normative
significance. 288
Althusser, by contrast, dismissed the concept of "subjectivity" as bour-
285. K. SOPER, supra note 266, at 86-88.
286. See G. BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION 117, 201-02 (1988).
287. See generally C. LLvI-STRAuSS, THE SAVAGE MIND, supra note 268, at 254-55 (meaning
is received rather than chosen; all meaning is "internal" to culture); M. PosTER, supra note 263, at
306-32.
288. The concluding chapter of L~vi-Strauss' THE SAVAGE MIND, supra note 268, is an attack
on Sartre's existential Marxism as imperialistic. See id. at 248-49, 257-58 (Sartre's associations of
humanity with subjectivity and of subjectivity with historical consciousness slight and dehumanize
nonwestern societies); id. at 254-56 ("history" and "subjectivity" are "myths," "internal" to western
culture); id. at 247, 262 ("humanism" wrongly views all human beings as fundamentally alike).
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geois ideology.2" 9 Where LEvi-Strauss saw conscious experience as dic-
tated by culture, Althusser saw conscious experience as dictated by a
"structure" that functioned to maintain existing "relations of produc-
tion."' ° According to Althusser, all culture was ideological and all ideolo-
gies "subjected" people by imposing individual identities on them.291 Ap-
parently rooting his conception of culture in Western society, Althusser
saw all culturally-conferred identity as sustaining an illusion of individual
autonomy.
While Levi-Strauss valued the cultures that structured experience, Al-
thusser presented the ideologies that structured experience as woven into
the straitjacket of capitalism. Where the structuralism of Levi-Strauss was
at least compatible with the ethic of cultural authenticity embraced by
national liberation movements, Althusser's structural Marxism denied
that culture could be a liberating force. Althusser cited Mao's essay On
Contradiction in support of a pessimistic view of capitalism as stable be-
cause "overdetermined."2 2 Yet Mao's essay expressed the optimism of a
successful Marxist revolutionary in a country where capitalism never took
root. Unlike Althusser, Mao saw history as indeterminate, pregnant with
opportunity.293
Althusser's thought was incompatible with the faith in culture needed
to sustain national liberation movements. But because he cited Mao, and
because his antihumanist rhetoric resonated with the antihumanist propa-
ganda emanating from Peking in the early 1960's, French Maoists like
Vergs embraced Althusser.2" 4 As a result, these supporters of national
liberation found themselves increasingly confused, celebrating Third
World cultures as inherently liberatory, while deploying a eurocentric
Marxist analysis that dismissed all culture as oppressive.
To make matters worse, structuralism soon evolved into the still more
289. M. POSTER, supra note 263, at 343-46; K. SOPER, supra note 266, at 104-05. L. AL-
THUSSER, FOR MARX 10-12 (B. Brewster trans. 1970) [hereinafter FOR MARX] (all humanism,
including Soviet version, is ideological); id. at 25 (humanism is bourgeois); id. at 221-22 (Soviet
humanist slogans attacked); id. at 230-31 (humanism is ideology which was opposed by mature
Marx); L. ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 170-71 (B. Brewster trans.
1971) [hereinafter LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY] (concept of subject is part of bourgeois ideology).
290. See generally LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 289 (ideology helps "reproduce" labor,
one of factors of production, by fitting individuals into existing "relations of production").
291. According to Althusser, ideology is false and should be distinguished from science. FOR
MARX, supra note 289, at 166-73, 183-93. All societies are reducible to economy, politics, and ideol-
ogy. Id. at 231-32. Ideologies are "perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects." Id. at 233. "The
category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology." LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 289.
"Subjects" are people "subjected" by the belief that they are "author of and responsible for their
actions." Id. at 182.
292. See I SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE TONG 311-37 (1967); FOR MARX, supra note 289,
at 94, 182-83, 193-94, 201, 211 (discussion of Mao's essay); id. at 99, 104-06 (revolutionary change
must be "overdetermined" because stability of capitalism is "over-determined").
293. 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE TUNG 337 (1967) (indeterminacy and dynamism of iden-
tity); id. at 341-42 (stability is ephemeral, change is constant); id. at 344 (expressing optimism about
socialist revolution everywhere); id. at 341 (capitalist stage can be skipped in Asia).
294. K. SOPER, supra note 266, at 88; M. POSTER, supra note 263, at 359, 375.
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fashionable post-structuralism of Althusser's "student" Michel Fou-
cault295 and Foucault's "disciple" Jacques Derrida.296 For Foucault, cul-
ture was the violent and exclusive product of power; it invaded and inhab-
ited whatever it purported to represent.2" For Derrida, culture was not
only violent, but incomplete, deceitful, contradictory."' From this per-
spective, Third World revolutionaries were precluded from resisting for-
eign occupation on behalf of indigenous culture, because culture was itself
a form of occupation. Revolutionaries could no longer hope to discover
their authentic identities in the experience of struggle or the traditions of
their people. The French left continued to support national liberation
movements, but it began to abandon the ethic of authenticity that had
originally identified such movements with its own Resistance. After
squandering a chance for power in 1968, the New Left seemed incapable
of sustaining its own identity.299
It was in this context, shortly before his disappearance, that Verges
developed a new conception of political advocacy, which he called defense
by "rupture."300 No longer attempting to gain recognition for the political
defendant's humanity, Vergs now advocated using the trial to illustrate a
breach of communications with the judicial system. Rather than being
broken down, the "wall of incomprehensibility"30' would be buttressed by
the defense attorney's refusal to collaborate with the judicial proceedings.
Now Verg~s completely subordinated the client's individual interests to
the expression of the client's political ideas.302 Nor were these ideas any
longer viewed as integral to the client's subjectivity: "[T]he personality of
the man in the dock is left to one side: the debate is purely political."30 3
The client had become dispensable.
3. Occupying the Occupier
Verges' decision to represent a committed Nazi reflected a further
evolution in the ethics of his advocacy, beyond the impersonal detachment
of the structuralist, to the paralyzing cynicism of the post-structuralist.
295. FOR MARX, supra note 289, at 257 (identifying Foucault as his student).
296. J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 31 (A. Bass, trans. 1978) (acknowledging "study-
ing under" Foucault and describing self as Foucault's "admiring and grateful disciple"). Foucault's
actual instruction of Derrida consisted only of preparing Derrida for university entrance exams.
297. See generally M. FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78-108 (1980).
298. See infra Section IV.
299. K. SOPER, supra note 266, at 88-90.
300. J. VERGkS, DE LA STRATEGIE JUDICIAIRE (1968). The term "rupture" (spelled the same
way in French and English), apparently fashionable among French intellectuals in the late 1960's, is
used frequently in J. DERRIDA, supra note 296. See, e.g., id. at 71 ("language is the rupture with
totality itself"). It is also used by Althusser in For Marx to describe contradictions that precipitate
revolution and to describe the mature Marx's break with humanism. FOR MARX, supra note 289, at
99, 227.
301. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
302. J. VERGkS, supra note 300, at 104.
303. Id. at 103 (quoted and translated in A. CAssEsE, supra note 28, at 114).
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Vergs could represent Barbie because he no longer felt ethically con-
strained to identify with the personality or even the politics of his client.
Like Barbie, he likened the SS to the French and Israeli armies, but
hardly for the purpose of valorizing the SS.
Vergs no longer feels obligated to identify with his clients' politics be-
cause he no longer feels capable of identifying with any politics. Rather
than displaying a rupture between the normative worlds of the state and
of his client, Vergs deployed his client to display a rupture within French
society. "The offense, the crime, is the revelation of a fracture in the social
order," he said in an interview.3 ' "There is no social order without frac-
tures."' 05 Vergs argued that Barbie's trial "is a kind of ritual ceremony.
They want, by spilling his blood, to do like they do when killing a goat,
exorcise some evil."306 He claimed no interest in Barbie, 317 but "given the
person not real, but mythological, manufactured for political reasons...
I think it is the duty of a lawyer to defend him."3 8° If the function of a
scapegoat is to unify society by expelling a symbol of violence, 0 9 Vergts
sought to rupture French society by forcing it to accept Barbie as a fellow
imperialist. Vergs sought to disrupt the sacrifice by holding the scapegoat
hostage, by occupying him. "I am the scapegoat of this trial!" Vergs an-
nounced, in apparent satisfaction. 310
Thus if Verges no longer feels bound by fidelity to his client, neither
does he seem bound by fidelity to himself. Vergs dons the mantle of legal
authority, claiming that "I am alone in saving France's judicial honor,"
while admitting that "my law is to be against all law. My morality is to
304. Ulbrich, Barbie's Lawyer, AP, Oct. 13, 1985 (NEXIS).
305. Id.
306. Ulbrich, supra note 227. "By killing an old man, some French are trying to think that they
are heroes." Ulbrich, Barbie Says Trial Feels Like Nuremberg, AP, May 12, 1987 (NEXIS). In the
title of the book in which he "exposed" the betrayal of Moulin, Vergs referred to Barbie's judges as
"Pontius Pilate," implicitly likening Barbie to Christ. See PILATE, supra note 205.
307. After hearing Verg&' elaborate rationale for defending Barbie, one observer asked him,
"You felt the need to say many times, 'I am not defending Barbie.' Then who is?" J. VERGiS, supra
note 213, at 28.
308. Ulbrich, supra note 304.
309. For the post-structuralist literary theorist Ren6 Girard, all cultural expression is ritualistic,
involving the perpetual reaffirmation or group identity. Group identity is reaffirmed by symbolically
purging the violent conflict that always threatens society. This involves identifying conflict with a
symbol-a scapegoat-that can be cast out of society, implying that conflict is external to the group.
See supra notes 143, 144. From this perspective, all symbolism or representation is a form of
scapegoating, involving violence and deceit; and all identity rests, in turn, on representation. Thus all
identity is rooted in deceit and violence.
Girard's view that culture is entirely devoted to purging irrepressible violence and irredeemable
guilt seems appropriate in the wake of the Holocaust, but its depressing implication is that the cul-
tures with which we identify, far from preventing carnage, rationalize it. Certainly the German iden-
tity promoted by the Nazis was rooted in the sacrifice of the Jews; and Verg&s may be right that
postwar French identity substitutes the condemnation of Nazism for the pursuit of liberty, equality,
and fraternity. In a slightly different vein, Holocaust Judaism rests on exclusion by the other instead
of exclusion of the other, but it also despairs of building community on the basis of shared ideals.
Girard's view that group identity is necessarily built on sacrificial symbolism makes sense of these
responses to the Holocaust-but at the cost of making the Holocaust itself appear sensible.
310. Rosemberg, supra note 259.
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be against all morality." ' Having deconstructed the ethic of authenticity,
the French New Left now resists not Occupation, but identification. Re-
ceiving film interviewer Marcel Ophuls in his office, Vergs' demeanor is
unabashedly artificial, flamboyantly studied, revealing nothing but a frank
contempt: "You know I deceive you," his bland smile seems to say, "and
yet I deceive you still.")312
Like many on the French left, Vergs reacted to the Occupation by
associating collaboration with inauthenticity. Identifying with anticolonial
resistance, Vergs aspired to represent the authentic voice of the occupied.
Like many on the French left, however, Vergs has lost faith in the possi-
bility of authenticity. The "wretched of the earth" still cry out for self-
determination, but Vergts can no longer believe that anyone has a true
self. Seeing collaboration everywhere, he has deconstructed the resistance
he once aspired to represent.
IV. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY AS A REPRESENTATION OF
NAZISM
Both sides in the Barbie trial represented their causes by contrast to
Nazism. This Commentary's analysis of the rhetoric of each side has re-
vealed that both identified themselves as opponents of Nazism because of
doubts about the credibility of their own beliefs.
Barbie's prosecutors participated in a tradition of Holocaust response
that canonizes victims of Nazism as sacrificial martyrs. This Commentary
has argued that Jewish participation in this sacrificial tradition is ill-ad-
vised because it rationalizes Jewish suffering as the price for gentile rec-
ognition of Jewish identity; because it compromises Jewish identity by
representing it within a Christian symbolic framework; and because it
questions the authenticity of Jewish identity by representing it as the
product of persecution rather than self-determination.
Barbie's attorney participated in a leftist tradition of response to the
Occupation that associates inauthenticity with Nazism. When postwar ex-
istentialists saw conformity as inauthentic, Verg&s came to see law as re-
pressive and deceitful. When 1960's structuralists saw individuality as il-
lusory, Vergs concluded that the individual client was of no consequence.
After post-structuralists announced that culture was inherently alien and
deceptive, Verges came to treat even his own anti-colonialism as a mask.
Hence, this Commentary has argued that national liberation movements
and leftist lawyers are both ill-advised to embrace post-structuralism: if
there can be no authentic identity then there can be neither a foreign
occupation to resist, nor a client to represent.
This Commentary's concluding Section explores the connection between
311. Rosemberg, supra note 4.
312. See Hotel Terminus, supra note 32.
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the postwar identity crises of Judaism and French leftism. Although an-
tagonistic at the Barbie trial, post-structuralism and Holocaust Judaism
are both symptoms of a common culture of despair that paralyzes moral
choice in the wake of Nazi atrocities. Because those atrocities were perpe-
trated by large numbers of ordinary people, postwar society is permeated
by anxiety that any of its members might have participated, collaborated
or acquiesced under similar circumstances. Believing that, like Nazism, all
creeds define themslves by their antipathies, members of postwar society
eschew commitment to any cause for fear of becoming complicit in future
atrocity. The only relief from such moral paralysis rests in the recollection
of Nazi crimes, because they constitute the only evil one can despise with-
out fear of becoming a Nazi oneself.
The despair common to post-structuralism and Holocaust Judaism is
illustrated by Jacques Derrida's "deconstruction" of identity. Probably no
one has contributed more to the French left's disenchantment with cul-
tural authenticity than this Algerian born post-structuralist. Yet this Sec-
tion will argue that Derrida, a Sephardic Jew, developed his critique of
cultural authenticity as a form of Holocaust Judaism.31 Seeing all iden-
tity as defined by exclusion, he views even his own Jewish identity as
tainted by the "logic" of Nazism. Yet in defining deconstruction as oppo-
sition to Nazism, he employs the very logic he condemns. In so doing, he
unacceptably implicates those who identify with Judaism in their own
persecution.
I would characterize Derrida's deconstruction as a form of Holocaust
Judaism because it expresses the alienation from Judaism of a writer
deeply engaged with the Jewish tradition, because that alienation is a re-
sponse to Nazi atrocities, and because the condemnation of those atrocities
provides him with a way of being Jewish that does not require faith in
any creed. The discovery that Derrida's deconstruction of identity can be
seen as a Holocaust response does not mean that the identity crisis of the
French left is caused by the crisis of Jewish identity. One could just as
easily reverse the causation since Wiesel, the foremost exponent of Holo-
caust Judaism, first formulated his response to the Holocaust under the
influence of French existentialism.3 4 Nevertheless, the Jewish context of
Derrida's critique of identity reveals that post-structuralism and Holo-
caust Judaism share a common cultural milieu: both emerged as part of a
postwar world determined to define itself in terms of its antipathies rather
than its convictions. This is the world of the Barbie trial, a world in
which Nazi atrocities, though universally regretted, are represented as a
valuable learning experience.
313. See Spivak, Translator's Preface to J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY ix (1976).
314. Wiesel writes in the adopted language of French and apparently modeled his style on that of
Camus. See generally Lamont, supra note 184. It takes little imagination to see his despairing theol-
ogy of the absurd as reflecting the influence of existentialism as well.
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A. Deconstructing Identity
A reading of two essays in Writing and Difference315 will reveal Der-
rida's deconstruction as a post war comment on the problem of Jewish
identity. In Edmond Jabhs and the Question of the Book, 86 Derrida re-
jects the idea that Jewishness makes Jews identical to one another or
identifies them all with any one thing. In Violence and Metaphysics: An
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,17 Derrida attacks the very
concept of identity as intolerant and "violent."
In The Question of the Book, Derrida explicitly questions whether one
can speak of "the Jewish community." '18 Like much of Derrida's work,
this essay attacks the idea that a group or culture can be identi-
fied-unified, made the same-by adherence to scripture, because scrip-
ture is always contradictory, disjointed. For Derrida, as for Wiesel, God
has nothing meaningful to say to humanity. "God," writes Derrida, "sep-
arated himself from himself in order to let us speak. . . . He did so not
by speaking but by keeping still, by letting silence interrupt his voice,...
by letting the tables be broken. '319 God's silence, His mystery, makes pos-
sible "our writing, certainly, but already his, which starts with the stifling
of his voice and the dissimulation of his face. This difference, this negativ-
ity in God is our freedom." 2' God dissembles and His scripture hides His
face which "no man may look upon." 321 God, concludes Derrida, "is not
truthful, he is not sincere. '3 22 For Derrida, scripture cannot unify, it can-
not be a source of identity because its author, God, is not one.
This position is so contrary to Jewish belief that it calls into question
its author's Jewish identity. Derrida attributes this apostasy to the poet
Edmond Jab~s, but with obvious sympathy. Jab~s, he insists, is Jewish in
the sense that he is following the footsteps of other Jews into exile from
Jewishness, from the law: "Negativity in God, exile as writing, the life of
the letter are all already in Cabala. Which means 'Tradition' itself....
But traditionality is not orthodoxy." 2 ' Jab~s, and by extension Derrida,
can be Jewish by virtue of their contribution to a tradition of speculation
and commentary, even though they are unorthodox, that is, they do not
accept the authority of Jewish law.324
315. J. DERRIDA, supra note 296.
316. Id. at 64-78.
317. Id. at 79-153.
318. Id. at 74.
319. Id. at 67.
320. Id. These passages are strikingly reminiscent of Wiesel's statement that "Within our tradi-
tion we know what God said at Sinai. But there are certain silences between word and word....
This is the silence I have tried to put into my writing." 1 E. WiESEL, supra note 1, at 273.
321. Exodus 33:20-23.
322. J. DERRIDA, supra note 296, at 68.
323. Id. at 74.
324. Derrida further complicates the question of his own identity and that of his "subject" Jabs,
by ending the essay with a "signed" quotation from Jabs' fictional character "Reb Rida." In so
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Derrida seems especially concerned that Jabts will not be accepted by
other Jews because of his treatment of Jewish suffering, of the Holocaust,
in universalist terms. "'You are all Jews,'" he quotes Jabts, "'even the
antisemites, for you have all been designated for martyrdom.' ",325 Jews,
however, "will all reproach him for this universalism." '26 Yet for Der-
rida, ambivalence about Jewish identity makes Jabts "more Jewish.1127
Derrida concludes that "[t]he Jew's identification with himself does not
exist," because ambivalence between particular identity and universal sig-
nificance is essential to Judaism.28 Derrida critiques Jewish identity as
divided between insularity and universality; yet his own critique proves to
be divided as well. Because Judaism is contradictory, he argues, it cannot
identify Jews with one another, or even with themselves. This is a cri-
tique of Judaism as inadequate to the full particularity of Jews. Yet he
also expresses anxiety that this internal critique of Judaism will be inter-
preted as "too universalistic"-in other words, as reflecting a desire to
identify with gentiles, to betray one's own particularity in the face of an-
tisemitic persecution.
In Violence and Metaphysics, Derrida defends himself against this po-
tential accusation of betrayal by arguing that Jewish identity is not only
contradictory, but also immoral. Violence and Metaphysics is a critique of
the existentialist philosopher Emmanuel Levinas' effort to reconcile Jew-
ish identity with openness and tolerance toward strangers. In Totality and
Infinity,"'9 Levinas asks his readers to identify themselves without relying
on a biblical scripture that purports to account for all creation and to
legislate all human behavior. Levinas rejects the image of God as totally
omniscient and omnipotent because it eliminates the human freedom
prized by the existentialist.330 Rather than abandoning religion, however,
he invites his readers to worship a God that is infinitely mysterious rather
than infinitely knowledgeable and powerful. Thus, he redefines the won-
der of God's creation as its infinite indeterminacy rather than its total
determinacy and transforms the creator from exacting lawgiver to fecund
artist. By worshipping a God that is infinitely remote, infinitely other,
people can be drawn together, but they will also be encouraged to respect
doing, Derrida claims a place in the rabbinic tradition, and questions whether the "Jab" Derrida
interprets is his own invention, or whether Jab s creates Reb (der) Rida in the act of being read by
him. Id. at 78; see also id. at 300 (additional essay on Jab~s signed "Reb Derissa," another of Jab&
characters).
325. Id. at 74-75.
326. Id.
327. "In this noncoincidence of the self and the self, he is more and less Jewish than the Jew."
Id.
328. Id. ("The Jew is split. . . .His history would be but one empirical history among others if
he. . .nationalized himself within difference. . . .He would have no history at all if he let himself
be attenuated within . . . an abstract universalism.").
329. E. LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINrrY (A. Lingis trans. 1969).
330. Id. at 292-94 (totality opposed to infinity, which Levinas equates with freedom).
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the otherness of their fellow humans. 331 Accordingly, by imagining God as
infinitely other, Jews can affirm their own particularity, their own dis-
tinctness, while accepting gentiles as divine creations, reflecting the mys-
tery of God." 2
While Derrida shares Levinas' hostility to the harsh determinacy of
scripture, he rejects Levinas' effort to ground a specifically Jewish identity
in infinite distance from an admired other. Although Derrida lobbies for
the recognition of difference in every context, he argues that recognition of
difference requires some similarity, some basis for communication. Thus
to identify oneself as radically different from others, to learn to be tolerant
of the "infinite otherness" of strangers, is to isolate oneself behind a wall
of silence. And this, argues Derrida, is the ultimate "violence." 333
For Derrida, such silence is violent because tolerance without commu-
nication is nothing more than the cruel indifference of a self-sufficient
God.3 4 Perhaps too, an abstract commitment to tolerate an infinitely dis-
tant other is compatible with violent efforts to expel or suppress the stran-
ger in one's midst. But there is another, more frightening sense in which
isolating oneself behind a facade of tolerance can lead to violence. Quite
simply, isolation leaves a community conspicuous and vulnerable to sacri-
ficial violence, as the Jews of Europe discovered. In equating noncom-
munication with violence, Derrida seems to admonish Jews that collective
isolation is not only unethical but also imprudent. Recognizing another's
difference is a fine thing, he seems to say, but insisting on your own dif-
ference can get you killed. Behind Derrida's moral argument for assimila-
tion lurks fear.
Derrida has learned his assimilationism from the Holocaust. In its
331. "Infinity . . .cannot be as violent as is totality." J. DERRIDA, supra note 296, at 107; see
also E. LEVINAS, supra note 329, at 292 (infinity contrasted to totality). According to Derrida,
Levinas sees God as infinitely other, and because Levinas sees all otherness as resembling God, he
believes all relations with others are made possible by religious faith. J. DERRIDA, supra note 296, at
95-96, 104, 107, 108; see E. LEVINAS, supra note 329, at 292-93 (otherness a miracle, facilitating
divine creation); see also id. at 291, 305 (pluralism is the good).
332. Levinas never makes the Jewish focus of To'rALrrY AND INFINrY explicit, but as Derrida
remarks, at its "heart" is "the face of Yahweh, who of course is never named." J. DERRIDA, supra
note 296, at 108. Levinas does, however, admit the thorough influence of Jewish theologian Franz
Rosenzweig's "opposition to the idea of totality," on Totality and Infinity. E. LEVINAS, supra note
329, at 28. Rosenzweig devalued the modern state in favor of family and and descent, which he saw as
the source of Jewish identity and eternity. E. BERKOVITS, MAJOR THEME.S IN MODERN PHII.OSO-
PHIES OF JUDAISM 40-41 (1974). Rosenzweig identified Jews as strangers everywhere, even from
God, whom they must address in foreign language, as opposed to Christians, who humanize God in
order to reduce His otherness. Id. at 41-43. Because of this fear of the other, Christianity is expan-
sionist. It is historical, whereas Jewish acceptance of otherness makes it ahistorical. Id. at 43-46.
Without naming it as Jewish, Levinas advocates this conception of identity. See E. LEViNAS, supra
note 329, at 268-69, 282-85 ("fecundity" (family life) relates individual to eternity). J. DERRIDA,
supra note 296, at 94, 97 (Levinas sees acceptance of otherness as ahistorical, while seeing historicism
as totalitarian); E. LEVINAS, supra note 329, at 252 (antistatism).
333. J. DERRIDA, supra note 296, at 117, 130.
334. See generally J. KAUFMAN, BROKEN AI.IIANE: THE TURBUI.ENT TIMES BEIVEEN
BLACKS AND JEWS IN AMERICA (1988) (example of limitations of abstract tolerance of stranger in
modern Jewish life).
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wake, he fears that to define himself at all is to incorporate what he con-
siders the Nazi logic of defining the other outside of oneself. Yet in defin-
ing his own deconstruction by contrast to this logic, he does incorporate it.
Deconstruction is not Nazism, but its influential critique of identity de-
pends upon an identification of Judaism with Nazism that misrepresents
both.
B. Deconstruction as a Representation of Nazism
Derrida presents deconstruction as a response to Nazism in a reading of
arguably pro-Nazi writings by the late Paul de Man, an important decon-
structive theorist. An originator with Derrida of deconstructive criticism,
de Man was recently discovered to have authored a number of essays for a
collaborationist newspaper in occupied Belgium during World War II.
One of these articles, The Jews in Present Day Literature,335 concludes
that European culture would suffer no loss if Jews were eliminated from
Europe. The discovery of this essay prompted accusations that deconstruc-
tion is tainted with Nazism.
The bases for this suspicion of deconstruction are threefold. First, be-
cause deconstruction shows every argument to contain its own opposite, it
seems nihilistic. Second, because deconstruction is said to "annihilate the
subject"-to deny the individual identities of authors and of characters-it
seems to deny individual responsibility for evil. Third, because it exposes
the futility of efforts to deny loss, contradiction and violence, deconstruc-
tion seems to urge acceptance of their necessity.336 Perhaps an "an-
tihumanist" philosophy that attempts to annihilate the subject sees no
great loss in the annihilation of subjects.3 37 In an anguished essay entitled
Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War,38
Derrida undertakes a difficult task: to justify deconstruction and to excuse
de Man, without justifying the charge that deconstruction excuses
antisemitism.
Derrida meets this challenge with his deconstructive critique of identity.
He attempts to detach de Man's deconstruction from de Man's earlier
antisemitism by denying that de Man can be identified with himself.339
The problem with Derrida's effort to detach the deconstruction of identity
335. See Derrida, Like The Sound of The Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 14
CRrHC:AI. INQUIRY 590 (1988).
336. See J. CUI..-R, supra note 143, at 93 (deconstruction critiques rhetoric of recuperation); K.
SoPER, supra note 266, at 122 (pessimistic implications or deconstruction).
337. See K. SOPIER, supra note 266, at 10-12; M. POSTER, supra note 263, at 319, 336-37 (anti-
humanist slogans of various structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers); see also Bernstein, Critics
Attempt to Reinterpret a Colleague's Disturbing Past: The de Man Affair, New York Times, July
17, 1988, § IV at 6, col. I (late city final ed.) (deconstruction accused of nihilism); Solomon, supra
note 12 (antihumanist New Novel associated with collaboration or political indifference).
338. Derrida, supra note 335.
339. See infra notes 343, 356-358 and accompanying text.
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from de Man's antisemitism is that Derrida's deconstructive arguments
are anticipated by the antisemitic text he deconstructs. The Jews in Pre-
sent Day Literature heaps contempt on Jews for having no distinctive
identity, and expresses annoyance that their claims to distinction force de
Man to express antisemitic opinions that are foreign to him. 40 Because
the young de Man's antisemitic text deconstructs itself in this precocious
way, it is hard to credit Derrida's later claim that deconstruction is the
opposite of antisemitism.3 4'
To make this claim plausible, Derrida is forced to redefine antisemitism
in universalist terms, as "totalitarianism. '3 4 Accordingly, his deconstruc-
tion responds to antisemitic persecution by denying that there is any such
thing as a Jew. The following reading of Paul de Man's War reveals that
deconstruction can excuse antisemites by refusing to identify them with
their antisemitism; at the same time it can implicate Jews in their own
persecution by claiming that it is "totalitarian" to identify as a Jew.
Derrida argues that the young de Man lacked commitment to the col-
laborationist and the antisemitic sentiments in his own essays, that he did
not identify with them. Derrida points out ways in which the young
critic's complex prose seemed to undermine the authority of his conclu-
sions. Thus, Derrida notes de Man's ironic failure to heed his own pre-
scient warning that politics is "'totally alien to [men of letters], so that
when they venture onto this terrain in that offhand way that only the
ignorant are capable of, one may expect the worst.' ",343 Yet this may be
read as the protest of a young aesthete at being forced by his editors to
write about politics, one who perhaps is more upset at having to collabo-
rate with politics than at the politics with which he is forced to
collaborate.
Consider Derrida's argument that The Jews in Present Day Literature
is really an attack on "vulgar antisemitism." For the young de Man, an-
tisemitism was vulgar if it rejected literary modernism as a Jewish inven-
tion. 4  According to de Man, to notice any Jewish influence on European
literature was to insult it: "It would be a rather unflattering appreciation
of Western writers to reduce them to being mere imitators of a Jewish
culture that is foreign to them. The Jews themselves have contributed to
spreading this myth. Often they have glorified themselves. 34 5 Derrida is
quite right in saying that de Man condemned "antisemitism as regards
literature." 6 The young de Man wanted to save modern literature from
340. See infra notes 345-353 and accompanying text.
341. See infra notes 356-368 and accompanying text.
342. See infra notes 361-67 and accompanying text.
343. Derrida, supra note 335, at 612 (quoting de Man).
344. Id. at 624.
345. Id.; see id. at 625 (Derrida's unconvincing argument that de Man's ascription of this "un-
flattering myth" to Jewish vanity undermines the statement's antisemitism).
346. Id.
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antisemitism by denying its Jewishness, just as he wanted to save it from
political repression by denying its politics. "
In de Man's defense, Derrida argues that de Man was pleading for the
autonomy of literature from politics at a time when authors were being
judged and persecuted for resisting Nazism rather than serving it.s4
Hence de Man's hollow boast that European literature was free of foreign
influence revealed an anxiety that the occupier's politics might invade his
own literature: "If our civilization had let itself be invaded by a foreign
force, then we would have to give up much hope for its future.""4 9
But whom does de Man blame for this predicament? To whom does he
attribute this invasion? What is the "foreign force" that threatens to cor-
rupt the literary sensibility that Derrida calls de Man's "culture?"350 Not
Germans, but Jews: "By keeping, in spite of semitic interference in all
aspects of European life, an intact originality, that civilization has shown
its basic nature is healthy."3 51 De Man here argues that Jewish influence,
having been successfully resisted, no longer threatens European culture.3 52
But in offering this argument, de Man also congratulates himself that he
has prevented "vulgar antisemitism"3 53 from invading his own personal
"culture." And if de Man has failed to resist antisemitism, he blames not
himself, but the invader, who is not even the real invader, but the in-
vader's favorite scapegoat, the Jew.
Thus the young de Man denied that he had been occupied by an-
tisemitism on the grounds that he was not preoccupied by Judaism. Insist-
ing that Jews did not influence him, he hoped to imply that Jews could
not perturb him. The complex excuse already embedded in this text may
explain why de Man never felt called upon to apologize for it in his later
life. 54
As Derrida suggests, de Man's deconstructive theory, which insists that
language is always alien to its speaker, implies repentance.355 We can
347. The "History of Art and literature . . . does not merge with sociopolitical history." Id.
(Derrida summarizing de Man's text).
348. Id. at 615, 628.
349. Id. at 631.
350. Id. at 636.
351. Id. at 631.
352. Id. at 630.
353. Id. at 624.
354. Id. at 638. Derrida here suggests that de Man's silence on this subject was explained, if not
broken, by a later essay; see de Man, Excuses (Confessions), in P. DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING
(1979) [hereinafter Excuses].
355. A reading of Rousseau's Confessions, Excuses, id., asserts the futility of all attempts to ex-
cuse what one has said: "the text can never stop apologising for the suppression of guilt that it per-
forms." Id. at 300. For the failure of excuses to excuse, de Man blames "a foreign element, that
disrupts the meaning, the readability of the apologetic discourse, and reopens what the excuse seems
to have closed off." Id. at 289-90. De Man's example of such a disrupted excuse is Rousseau's excuse
for falsely accusing a friend, that he did so in order to excuse himself of the same misdeed. Id. at 288.
It is this scapegoat, this friend, that for de Man is the foreign element that makes the effort to excuse
oneself inexcusable. Where the young de Man was inclined with Rousseau to see such foreign ele-
ments as contingent, as not really influencing his language, the mature de Man acknowledges the
19891 1379
The Yale Law Journal
imagine de Man congratulating what he calls the "foreign element" in his
own language: Thank God, my friend that I could not eradicate you!
Thank God I could not mean what I said! But de Man's theory also im-
plies an excuse, one he has made before: After all, I could not say what I
meant. My language was invaded. My cruelty towards you, though una-
voidable, was not my own.
And Derrida, de Man's embarassed friend accepts this excuse:356 The
de Man that was his friend, is not the de Man that wrote an antisemitic
essay. Like the Jew, de Man is not identical with himself but is divided
from his past by a "rupture." 5' Yet de Man's innocence is over-deter-
mined: bearing no responsibility for his past de Man has nevertheless rec-
tified it. Thus Derrida insists that de Man's mature deconstruction always
deconstructs de Man's own youthful writing. Between de Man's decon-
struction and de Man's antisemitism, Derrida demands a "war." '358
Derrida insists on this war because Paul de Man's War is not merely a
defense of Paul de Man, but a defense of deconstruction against the
charge of antisemitism. Derrida's defense is that deconstruction is essen-
tially opposed to Nazism and that deconstruction is also essential to op-
posing Nazism. Thus Derrida refers to Nazism, without naming it, as
"what has always been for me the worst." '59 He later argues that inter-
preting de Man's antisemitic article carefully fulfills a responsibility to the
"victims of discourses that at least resembled" it.360 Next he claims that
attempts to identify this early antisemitic article with de Man's later work
are "guided by [the] principle of the worst totalitarian police."3 61 To iden-
tify de Man with himself is to seek a "historical totalization," that subor-
dinates "discontinuities" to a "totaliarian logic. '3 62 "Since we are talking
at this moment about discourse that is totalitarian, fascist, Nazi, racist,
antisemitic and so forth. . . I would like to do. . . whatever possible to
avoid the logic of the discourse thus incriminated."36
But is this resistance to "the logic of totalitarianism" appropriate only
because at the moment "we are talking of discourse that is totalitarian?"
No, it quickly becomes apparent that this "rule" of interpretation applies
to all discourse, not just de Man's: "a formalizing, saturating totalization
necessity, the ineradicability of such foreign elements.
356. Derrida describes the nationalist and antisemitic rhetoric of de Man's collaborationist essays
as already familiar to him as part of a preexisting "ideological configuration," appropriated by de
Man. Derrida, supra note 335, at 600.
357. Id. at 635, 641, 646, 648.
358. Id. at 594. This argument that de Man's deconstruction developed in reaction to his youthful
error suggests that Derrida is not only defending de Man as a man capable of learning from his
mistake-he is defending de Man's antisemitic essay as a mistake capable of teaching de Man the
value of deconstruction.
359. Id. at 600.
360. Id. at 631.
361. Id. at 641.
362. Id. at 641.
363. Id. at 645 (emphasis in original).
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seems to me to be precisely the essential character of this logic whose
project, at least, and whose ethico-political consequence can be terrifying.
One of my rules is never to accept this project and consequence." ' ' Ap-
parently Derrida is always talking of a "discourse that is totalitarian"; in
fact, rejecting the totalitarian is precisely the purpose of deconstruction:
"One must analyze as far as possible this process of formalization and its
program . . . It has occurred to me on occasion to call this deconstruc-
tion.13 6 5 Deconstruction, in short, is this critical analysis of totalitarian
logic. "What I have practiced under that name has always seemed to me
favorable, indeed destined (it is no doubt my principal motivation) to the
analysis of the conditions of totalitarianism in all its forms." 8'
But Derrida goes still farther. Not only is deconstruction a response to
the Holocaust, it is a necessary response: "[D]econstructions have always
represented, as I see it, the at least necessary condition for identifying and
combatting the totalitarian risk in all [its] forms.13 67 We cannot combat
totalitarianism without deconstructing.
Why? Derrida's reason is the contradiction he leads us to expect in
every text. We must deconstruct in order to combat the totalitarian logic
of identity, because only deconstruction enables us to identify instances of
totalitarianism: "Do we have access to a complete formalization of this
logic? . . . Is there a systematic set of themes . . . which, forming a
closed and identifiable coherence of what we call totalitarianism, fascism,
nazism, racism, antisemitism, never appear outside these formations and
especially never on the opposite side? . . . Is there some property so
closed and so pure that one may not find any element of these systems in
discourses that are commonly opposed to them? . . . I do not believe that
there is." '68
C. Conclusion: Representing Nazism
This Commentary's reading of the Barbie trial has confirmed that "to-
talitarianism, fascism, Nazism, racism [and] antisemitism," are not the
same thing, and so cannot be identified with one another. Accordingly,
Derrida is correct that the atrocity to which they all refer cannot be iden-
tified or represented. The effort to represent Nazism is motivated by the
hope of defining oneself in opposition to that atrocity. For some
Frenchmen, the appeal of such an identity is the hope of deflecting the
364. Id. at 645 (emphasis in original).
365. Id. at 646.
366. Id. at 648.
367. Id. at 647. Note that this sentence contains qualifications, most importantly the insistence
that deconstructive acts not be reified as "deconstruction." While it is admirable to avoid reifying
ideas one is critiquing, a refusal to be identified with one's own ideas, or even to identify them, is a
flight from responsibility. Recall that Barbie refused to reduce Nazism to definition. See supra notes
199-203 and accompanying text.
368. Derrida, supra note 335, at 645.
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charge of collaboration. For some Israelis, its appeal is the moral license it
seems to grant their country. For some Jews, its appeal is simply the hope
of having some identity after the catastrophic discrediting of the covenant
that the Holocaust involved for them. So people represent Nazism in or-
der to identify and justify themselves.
While rejecting identity as a Nazi concept, Derrida identifies decon-
struction by contrast to Nazism; while acknowledging that Nazism cannot
be represented, Derrida represents Nazism as the antithesis of deconstruc-
tion. Derrida is driven to these contradictions by the need to escape the
dangers of being seen as a traitor to the Jewish people. Representing Na-
zism as totalitarianism rather than as antisemitism enables Derrida to dis-
tinguish his own critique of Jewish culture from the similar critique of-
fered by the young de Man. Thus the young de Man's antisemitic text is
"totalitarian" because it dismisses Judaism as superfluous for an essen-
tially gentile culture. Rejecting the "totalitarian" concept of cultural iden-
tity, however, Derrida dismisses Judaism as superfluous even for Jews.
According to Derrida, the young de Man's antisemitism is wrong not be-
cause it is hostile to Judaism, but only because it identifies individual
Jews with Judaism. Hence, to retain a sense of Jewish identity after the
Holocaust is, for Derrida, to be a totalitarian, a Nazi. Jewishness, alas,
turns out to be an invader that must be expelled into exile.
Derrida's viewpoint is that Judaism is not a unity that can offer Jews
an identity. Instead it is a problem, a set of issues, conflicts, or ambiva-
lences. Jews cannot determine who they are by reference to a contradic-
tory Jewish law. While they can participate in a tradition of commentary,
that tradition has expressed the self-alienation of the victim of persecution.
Hence Jews must disperse themselves in an alien world beyond Jewish
tradition even in order to locate themselves within it. For Derrida, there
can be no Jewish community because there is no unique Jewish nomos.
Judaism is incoherent and incomplete, not just as a legal code but as a
culture. For Derrida, Jewishness is a condition of isolating alienation and
political powerlessness, dependent upon persecution. Hence Derrida's de-
fense of de Man ultimately emerges as the claim that without antisemit-
ism no one could remain a Jew. Derrida's deconstruction shows the con-
vergence of Holocaust Judaism with assimilationism.
Because Jewish identity can get one killed, Derrida deconstructs the
scripture in which it is rooted. Hence, like the most unorthodox Jewish
theologian of the Holocaust, Richard Rubenstein, Derrida seems eager to
shed his Jewish identity, now that the Holocaust has revealed that iden-
tity as neither authorized nor protected by God.
Having abandoned Jewish identity, Derrida redefines himself as an op-
ponent of Nazism. Hence, like the most popular theologians of the Holo-
caust, Elie Wiesel and Emil Fackenheim, Derrida seems overly optimistic
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that an identity rooted in the Holocaust can substitute for the loss of Jew-
ish values.
By representing Judaism as the totalitarian interpretation of scripture,
Derrida implicates Jews in their own persecution. Hence, like the most
orthodox theologians, who see Jewish suffering as the price of transgres-
sion, Derrida seems ready to accept Jewish responsibility for the Holo-
caust. Treating the Holocaust as an argument for deconstruction, Derrida
resembles those theologians who see suffering as God's way of teaching a
more rigorous practice of interpreting scripture.
Derrida is wrong that deconstruction is an adequate substitute for Jew-
ish identity because he is right that Nazism cannot be a source of identity
for Jews. Deconstruction demonstrates the futility of representing Nazism,
but it does not prove that we are all Nazis any more than it proves Jab~s'
claim that "you are all Jews." And if it suggests that Jews be wary of
"learning" their Jewishness from the Holocaust, it cannot convince me
that the Holocaust teaches them not to be Jews.
Leftists in France and in the Third World must learn that deconstruc-
tion proves inadequate as a source of utopian political theory for the same
reason that it proves inadequate as a source of Jewish theology. Arguing
that no creed can be coherent, deconstruction denies that any polity can
realize a distinctive nomos. If no individual can identify herself by refer-
ence to a creed, then no individual can claim that the realization of her
identity depends upon that creed's embodiment in a political community.
There can be no right of self-determination if there is no self.
Barbie's judges, prosecutors, and defenders all reified the highly ques-
tionable assumption that German atrocities were caused by a coherent and
identifiable ideology. This assumption reassured the trial's spectators that
they had only to condemn Nazism in order to identify the values in which
they believed. Deconstruction advises its readers that they do better to
avoid identifying their values in a world where Nazism is the only identi-
fiable and coherent ideology. Yet the nocturnal world in which Klaus
Barbie met his victims was misted in anonymity. Accordingly, I remain
unconvinced that unspeakable crimes can be ascribed to any identifiable
set of values. To my mind, the representations of Nazism offered at the
Barbie trial were the cries of those trapped in a culture devoid of values.
To live in such a culture is to join an endless procession of the nameless,
bound in the night for an unknown destination.
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